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On the Deidability of Cryptographi Protools withOpen-ended Data StruturesRalf KustersInstitut fur Informatik und Praktishe MathematikCAU Kiel, Germanykuestersti.informatik.uni-kiel.deAbstratFormal analysis of ryptographi protools has mainly onentrated on proto-ols with losed-ended data strutures, where losed-ended data struture meansthat the messages exhanged between prinipals have xed and nite format.However, in many protools the data strutures used are open-ended, i.e., mes-sages have an unbounded number of data elds. Formal analysis of protools withopen-ended data strutures is one of the hallenges pointed out by Meadows. Thiswork studies deidability issues for suh protools. We propose a protool modelin whih prinipals are desribed by transduers, i.e., nite automata with output,and show that in this model seurity is deidable and PSPACE-hard in preseneof the standard Dolev-Yao intruder.1 IntrodutionFormal methods are very suessful in analyzing the seurity of ryptographi proto-ols. Using these methods, many aws have been found in published protools. Bynow, a large variety of dierent methods and tools for ryptographi protool analysisis available (see [15℄ for an overview). In partiular, for dierent interesting lassesof protools and intruders, seurity has been shown to be deidable, usually based onthe Dolev-Yao model [7℄ (see the paragraph on related work).Previous work has mostly onentrated on protools with losed-ended data stru-tures, where messages exhanged between prinipals have xed and nite format. Inwhat follows, we will refer to these protools as losed-ended protools. In many pro-tools, however, the data strutures are open-ended (see Setion 2 for examples): thenumber of data elds that must be proessed by a prinipal in one reeive-send ationis unbounded, where reeive-send ation means that a prinipal reeives a message andreats, after some internal omputation, by sending a message. We will all protoolswith open-ended data strutures open-ended.This paper addresses open-ended protools, and thus deals with one of the hal-lenges pointed out by Meadows [15℄. The goal is to devise a protool model rih enoughto apture a large lass of open-ended protools suh that seurity is deidable; thelong-term goal is to develop tools for automati veriation of open-ended protools.1
Open-ended protools make it neessary to model prinipals who an perform inone reeive-send ation an unbounded number of internal ations; only then theyan handle open-ended data strutures. Thus, the rst problem is to nd a goodomputational model for reeive-send ations. It turns out that one annot simplyextend the existing models. More speially, Rusinowith and Turuani [20℄ desribereeive-send ations by single rewrite rules and show seurity to be NP-omplete. Therewrite rules may ontain non-linear terms (in partiular, messages an be hekedfor equality) and the prinipals have unbounded memory. To handle open-endedprotools, we generalize their model in a anonial way and show that if reeive-send ations are desribed by sets of rewrite rules, seurity is undeidable, even withi) nite memory and non-linear terms, or ii) unbounded memory and linear terms.Thus, we need a omputational model in whih prinipals have nite memory andannot ompare messages of arbitrary size for equality.For this reason, we propose to use transduers, i.e., nite automata with output, asthe omputational model for reeive-send ations, sine transduers satisfy the aboverestritions, and still, an deal with open-ended data strutures. Setion 5.1 ontainsa detailed disussion on our so-alled transduer-based model. The main tehnialresult of this paper is that in the transduer-based model, seurity is deidable andPSPACE-hard under the following assumptions: the number of sessions is bounded,i.e., a protool is analyzed assuming a xed number of interleaved protool runs; andnones and omplex keys are not allowed. We, however, put no restritions on theDolev-Yao intruder; in partiular, the message size is unbounded. These are standardassumptions also made in most deidable models for losed-ended protools [20, 2, 13℄.1The results indiate that from a omputational point of view, the analysis of open-ended protools is harder than for losed-ended protools, for whih seurity is \only"NP-omplete [20℄. The additional omplexity omes from the fat that now we have,beside the Dolev-Yao intruder, another soure of innite behavior: the unboundednumber of internal ations (i.e., paths in the transduers of unbounded length). Thisalso makes it neessary to devise new proof tehniques to show deidability. Roughlyspeaking, using that transduers only have nite memory we will use a pumpingargument showing that the length of paths in the transduers an be bounded in thesize of the problem instane.Related work. All deidability and undeidability results obtained so far only apply tolosed-ended protools. Deidability depends on the following parameters: Deidabil-ity depends on the following parameters: bounded or unbounded number of sessions,bounded or unbounded message size, absene or presene of pairing, nones, and/oromplex keys.Usually, if one allows for an unbounded number of sessions, seurity is undeidable[1, 8, 2, 9℄, exept when the message size is bounded and nones are disallowed [8℄(then seurity is EXPTIME-omplete), or pairing is disallowed [6, 2℄ (then seurityis in P). The situation is muh better if one puts a bound on the number of sessionsand disallows nones. Then, even with pairing and unbounded message size, seurity1In [20, 13℄, however, omplex keys are allowed.2
is deidable [20, 2, 13℄ and NP-hard [20, 2℄; Rusinowith and Turuani [20℄ show NP-ompleteness with omplex keys. Exept for omplex keys, we make exatly the sameassumptions in our models.To the best of our knowledge, the only ontributions on formal analysis of open-ended protools are the following: The reursive authentiation protool [5℄ has beenanalyzed by Paulson [18℄, using the Isabelle theorem prover, as well as by Bryansand Shneider [4℄, using the PVS theorem prover. The A-GDH.2 protool [3℄ hasbeen analyzed by Meadows [14℄ with the NRL Analyzer, and manually by Pereira andQuisquater [19℄, based on a model similar to the strand spaes model. As mentioned,deidability issues have not been studied so far.Struture of the paper. In Setion 2, we give examples of open-ended protools. Wethen dene a generi model for desribing open-ended protools (Setion 3). In thismodel, reeive-send ations an be arbitrary omputations. In Setion 4, we on-sider two instanes of the generi model in whih reeive-send ations are speied bysets of rewrite rules, and show the mentioned undeidability result. The transduer-based model, the instane of the generi protool model in whih reeive-send ationsare given by transduers, is introdued in Setion 5. This setion also ontains thementioned disussion. Setion 6 ontains the atual deidability result and in Se-tion 7 we prove the omplexity lower bound. Finally, we onlude in Setion 8. Theappendix provides a detailed desription of the reursive authentiation protool (Ap-pendix A) and a formalization of this protool in the transduer-based protool model(Appendix B).2 Examples of Open-ended ProtoolsOne example of an open-ended protool is the IKE Protool [12℄, in whih a prinipalneeds to pik a seurity assoiation (SA) among an a priori unbounded list of SAs,where an SA is the olletion of algorithms and other informations used for enryptionand authentiation. Suh a list of SAs is an open-ended data struture, sine it has anunbounded number of data elds to be examined by a prinipal. An attak on IKE,found by Zhou [22℄ and independently Ferguson and Shneier [10℄, shows that whenmodeling open-ended protools, the open-ended data strutures must be taken intoaount, sine otherwise some attaks might not be found. In other words, as alsopointed out by Meadows [15℄, open-endedness is seurity relevant.Other typial open-ended protools are group protools, for example, the reur-sive authentiation protool [5℄ and the A-GDH.2 protool [3℄, whih is part of theCLIQUES projet [21℄. Group protools often allow for an unbounded number ofreeive-send ations in one protool run. In our models, we will, however, assumea xed bound on the number of reeive-send ations, sine otherwise, just as in thease of an unbounded number of sessions, seurity in general leads to undeidability.Nevertheless, even with suh a xed bound it is still neessary to model open-endeddata strutures. The most important reason is that the intruder an produe messageswith an unbounded number of data elds, whih must be proessed by the prinipals.3
Also, as in the IKE protool, open-ended data strutures may our independently ofwhether there is a bound on the number of reeive-send ations or not.In Appendix A, the reursive authentiation protool is desribed in detail, and inAppendix B we provide a formalization in the transduer-based protool model.3 A Generi Protool ModelOur generi protool model and the underlying assumptions basially oinide withthe ones proposed by Rusinowith et al. [20℄ and Amadio el al. [2℄ for losed-endedprotools. However, the important dierene is that in the generi model, reeive-sendations are, roughly speaking, binary relations over the message spae, and thus anbe interpreted as arbitrary omputations. In the models of Rusinowith el al. andAmadio et al. , reeive-send ations are desribed by single rewrite rules or proesseswithout loops, respetively.Thus, the generi protool model is a very general framework for open-endedprotools. In fat, it is muh to general to study deidability issues. In the subsequentsetions we will onsider dierent instanes of this model.The main features of the generi protool model an be summarized as follows: a generi protool is desribed by a nite set of prinipals; the internal state spae of a prinipal may be innite (whih, for example, enablesa prinipal to store arbitrarily long messages); every prinipal is desribed by a nite sequene of reeive-send ations; reeive-send ations are arbitrary omputations.We make the following assumptions: the intruder is the standard Dolev-Yao intruder; in partiular, we do not putrestritions on the size of messages; prinipals and the intruder annot generate nones; keys are atomi; the number of sessions is bounded. More preisely, the sessions onsidered inthe analysis are only those enoded in the protool desription itself.These are standard assumptions also made in deidable models for losed-ended pro-tools; in partiular, they oinide with the ones in [2℄, and exept for omplex keys,with those in [20, 13℄.Let us now give a formal denition of the generi protool model.
4
3.1 MessagesThe denition of messages is rather standard. Let N denote a nite set of atomimessages, ontaining keys, names of prinipals, et. as well as the speial atomimessage seret. The set of messages (over N ) is the least set M that satises thefollowing properties: N M; if m;m0 2M, then mm0 2M; if m 2M and a 2 N , then ena(m) 2M; if m 2M, then hash(m) 2M.As usual, onatenation is an assoiative operation, i.e., (mm0)m00 = m(m0m00). Notethat we only allow for atomi keys, i.e., in a message ena(), a is always an atomimessage.Let " denote the empty message andM" :=M[f"g the set of messages ontaining". Note that " is not allowed inside enryptions or hashes, that is, ena() 62 M" andhash() 62 M".The size jmj of a message m is the number of ourrenes of atomi messages,enryption, and hash funtions in m; j"j := 0.Later, we will also onsider terms, i.e., messages with variables. Let V := fv0; : : : ;vn 1g be a set of variables. Then a term t (over V ) (also written t(v0; : : : ; vn 1))is a message over the atomi messages N [ V , where variables are not allowed askeys, i.e., terms of the form env() for some variable v are forbidden. Let T (V )denote the set of terms over V and T"(V ) := T (V ) [ f"g. For t0; : : : ; tn 1; t 2 T"(V ),t[v0=t0; : : : ; vn 1=tn 1℄ denotes the term obtained from t by simultaneously substitut-ing the variables vi by ti. A term t0 2 T"(V ) is a subterm of t 2 T"(V ) if there existsa term t00 2 T (V [ fvg), where v is a new variable ourring exatly one in t00, suhthat t = t00[v=t0℄. A substitution  is a mapping from V into M". If t 2 T"(V ), then(t) denotes the message obtained from t by replaing every variable v in t by (v).The depth depth(t) of a term t is the maximum number of nested enryptions andhashes in t, i.e., depth(") := 0, depth(a) := 0 for every a 2 N [ V ; depth(tt0) := maxfdepth(t); depth(t0)g; depth(ena(t)) := depth(t) + 1; depth(hash(t)) := depth(t) + 1.Given a nite subset of messages K  M", the maximum depth of messages in K isdenoted by depth(K) := maxfdepth(m) j m 2 d(K)g:3.2 The Intruder ModelWe use the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model [7℄. That is, an intruder has ompleteontrol over the network and an derive new messages from his urrent knowledgeby omposing, deomposing, enrypting, derypting, and hashing messages. As usual5
in the Dolev-Yao model, we make the perfet ryptography assumption. We do notimpose any restritions on the size of messages.The (possibly innite) set of messages d(K) the intruder an derive from K M"is the smallest set satisfying the following onditions: K  d(K); if mm0 2 d(K), then m 2 d(K) and m0 2 d(K) (deomposition); if ena(m) 2 d(K) and a 2 d(K), then m 2 d(K) (deryption); if m 2 d(K) and m0 2 d(K), then mm0 2 d(K) (omposition); if m 2 d(K), m 6= ", and a 2 N \ d(K), then ena(m) 2 d(K) (enryption); if m 2 d(K) and m 6= ", then hash(m) 2 d(K) (hashing).Let an(K) denote the losure of K under deomposition and deryption, and syn(K)the losure of K under omposition, enryption, and hashing. It is well-known that,sine we only allow for atomi keys, d(K) an be obtained by rst taking the losure ofK under deomposition and deryption, and from this the losure under omposition,enryption, and hashing. Formally this means (see, e.g., [2℄ for a proof):Lemma 1 If K M", then d(K) = syn(an(K)).3.3 ProtoolsProtools are desribed by sets of prinipals and every prinipal is dened by a se-quene of reeive-send ations, whih are performed one after the other. Sine weare interested in attaks, the denition of a protool also ontains the initial intruderknowledge. Formally, prinipals and protools are dened as follows.Denition 2 A generi prinipal  is a tuple (Q; I; n; ) where Q is the (possibly innite) set of states of ; I is the set of initial states of ; n is the number of reeive-send ations to be performed by ;  is a mapping assigning to every j 2 f0; : : : ; n   1g a reeive-send ation(j)  QM" M" Q.A generi protool P is a tuple (n; figi<n;K) where n is the number of prinipals; figi<n is a family of n generi prinipals, and K M" is the initial intruder knowledge.Note that reeive-send ations are arbitrary relations. Intuitively, they take an inputmessage and nondeterministially, depending on the urrent state, return an outputmessage plus a new state. Later, when we onsider instanes of the generi protool6
model, one reeive-send ation of a prinipal will onsist of an unbounded number ofinternal ations.We also remark that a protool P is not parametrized by n. In partiular, whenwe say that P is seure, we mean that P is seure given the n prinipals as dened inthe protool. We do not mean that P is seure for every number n of prinipals.3.4 Attaks on ProtoolsIn an attak on a protool, the reeive-send ations of the prinipals are interleaved insome way and the intruder, who has omplete ontrol over the ommuniation, triesto produe inputs for the prinipals suh that from the orresponding outputs andhis initial knowledge he an derive the seret message seret. Formally, an attak isdened as follows.Denition 3 Let P = (n; figi<n;K) be a generi protool with i = (Qi; Ii; ni; i),for i < n. An attak on P is a tuple onsisting of the following omponents: a total ordering < on the set f(i; j) j i < n; j < nig suh that (i; j) < (i; j0)implies j < j0 (the exeution order of the reeive-send ations);2 a mapping  assigning to every (i; j), i < n, j < ni, a tuple (i; j) = (qji ;mji ;m0ji ; qj+1i )with{ qji ; qj+1i 2 Qi (the state of i before/after performing i(j)); and{ mji ;m0ji 2 M" (the input message reeived and output message sent byi(j));suh that q0i 2 Ii for every i < n; mji 2 d(K [ fm0j0i0 j (i0; j0) < (i; j)g) for every i < n, j < ni; (qji ;mji ;m0ji ; qj+1i ) 2 i(j) for every i < n, j < ni.An attak is alled suessful if seret 2 d(K [ fm0ji j i < n; j < nig).The deision problem we are interested in is the following:Attak: Given a protool P , deide whether there exists a suessful attak on P .A protool guarantees serey if there does not exist a suessful attak. In this ase,we say that the protool is seure.Whether Attak is deidable or not heavily depends on what kinds of reeive-send ations a prinipal is allowed to perform. In the subsequent setions, we look2Although, we assume a linear ordering on the reeive-send ations performed by a prinipal, weould as well allow partial orderings (as in [20℄) without any impat on the deidability and omplexityresults. 7
at dierent instanes of generi protools, i.e., dierent omputational models forreeive-send ations, and study the problem Attak for the lasses of protools thusobtained.4 Undeidability ResultsWe extend the model proposed by Rusinowith and Turuani [20℄ in a straightforwardway suh that open-ended protools an be handled, and show that this extensionleads to undeidability of seurity.The model by Rusinowith and Turuani an be onsidered as the instane of thegeneri protool model in whih reeive-send ations are desribed by single rewriterules of the form t! t0, where t and t0 are terms.3 The internal state of a prinipal isgiven impliitly by the values assigned to the variables ourring in the rewrite rules {dierent rules may share variables. In partiular, a prinipal has unbounded memoryto store information for use in subsequent reeive-send ations. Roughly speaking, amessage m is transformed by a reeive-send ation of the form t! t0 into the message(t0), where  is a substitution satisfying m = (t). In [20℄, it is shown that in thissetting, Attak is NP-omplete.Of ourse, in this model open-ended data strutures annot be handled sine theleft hand-side of a rewrite rule t has a xed and nite format, and thus, one an onlyproess messages with a xed number of data elds.A natural extension of this model, whih allows to deal with open-ended datastrutures, is to desribe reeive-send ations by sets of rewrite rules, whih an non-deterministially be applied to the input message. More preisely, we will onsidertwo dierent extensions: In the rst extension, prinipals do not have memory to storemessages, but in the rewrite rules non-linear terms may our, and thus, a prinipalan ompare messages for equality; in the seond extension, prinipals an store onemessage, but the rewrite rules may only ontain linear terms. The rst extensionare the so-alled rule-based protools and the seond extensions the linear-term one-memory protools. In what follows, both extensions are dened and the undeidabilityresults are proved.4.1 Rule-based ProtoolsA reeive-send ation will be dened by a set of input, output, and so-alled proessrules. A message is proessed by suh an ation as follows: First one of the inputrules is applied, resulting in a new message. Then, non-deterministially, proess rulesare applied to this message, and nally, one of the output rules is used to produethe atual output. In a more powerful model, one ould allow a prinipal to produeoutput also when applying a proess rule. However, to obtain a stronger undeidabilityresult, we stik to the more restrited model.Formally, as already mentioned, a rewrite rule is of the form t! t0, where t and t0are terms. A (rule-based) ation A of a prinipal is a tuple (I;O;R), where I, O, and3Sine Rusinowith and Turuani allow for omplex keys, the terms are more general than the oneswe use here. However, we will only onsider terms as dened in Setion 3.1.8
R are nite sets of rewrite rules (the input, output, and proess rules, respetively).For every rule t! t0 2 R we require that for all substitutions , j(t0)j < j(t)j. Thisguarantees that proess rules an only be applied to a message a nite number oftimes.A rule-based ation A denes the following binary relation RA on M"  M":(m;m0) 2 RA i there exist substitutions 0; : : : ; n and rewrite rules r0; : : : ; rn withri = ti ! t0i, for every i  n, suh that r0 2 I, rn 2 O, and ri 2 R for every 0 < i < n; 0(t0) = m; n(t0n) = m0; and i(t0i) = i+1(ti+1) for every i < n.A generi protool for whih the reeive-send ations an be desribed by rule-basedations is alled rule-based protool. Note that sine in this setting prinipals do nothave states, reeive-send ations are simply subsets ofM"M" instead of QM"M" Q.Theorem 4 For rule-based protools, Attak is undeidable.The proof shows that this theorem holds true even for protools onsisting only of oneprinipal, whih may perform only one reeive-send ation. In other words, the unde-idability omes from the internal ations alone. Also, the problem is even undeidableif the intruder is not allowed to enrypt, derypt, or hash messages.The proof is rather straightforward. It is by redution from Post's CorrespondeneProblem (PCP), whih is dened as follows: Given an alphabet  with at least twoletters and two sequenes u0; : : : ; un 1 and v0; : : : ; vn 1 of words over  (inludingthe empty word "), deide whether there exist indies i0; : : : ; ik 1, k > 0, suh thatui0 : : : uik 1 = vi0 : : : vik 1 .Given suh a problem, we dene the orresponding rule-based protool P as fol-lows: P has one prinipal performing one ation A = (I;O;R) with I := fx = x! x = xg; O := fui = vi ! seret j i < kg; R := fuix = viy ! x = y j i < kg,where x and y are variables. The initial intruder knowledge is K := [ f=g. Now, itis easy to see that P allows a suessful attak i the instane of PCP has a solution.Obviously, the intruder does not need to enrypt, derypt, or hash messages.The redution does not work if only linear terms are allowed in rewrite rules,beause then one annot ompare submessages of arbitrary size for equality. Morespeially, the rule x = x ! x = x is not allowed, sine x = x is not a linear term.Nevertheless, if prinipals an store one message and this message an be omparedwith a submessage of the message being proessed, we still have undeidability. Thisleads us to the linear-term one-memory protools.9
4.2 Linear-term One-memory ProtoolsA linear-term one-memory ation A is a tuple (I;O;R) suh that I is a set of rules of the form s! (t; t0), where s; t; t0 are linear terms; O is a set of rules of the form (s; s0)! t, where s; s0; t are linear terms; R is a set of rules of the form (s; s0) ! (t; t0), where s; s0; t; t0 are linear termsand for all substitutions , j(t)j+ j(t0)j < j(s)j+ j(s0)j.Note that the state of a prinipal only depends on the urrent input and is independentof previous reeive-send ations. Therefore, similar to rule-based ations, a linear-termone-memory ation A = (I;O;R) indues a binary relation RA M"M" instead ofa relation on QM"M"Q: (m;m0) 2 RA i there exist substitutions 0; 1; : : : ; nand rules r0; : : : ; rn suh that r0 2 I, rn 2 O, and ri 2 R for every 0 < i < n; 0(s0) = m if r0 = s0 ! (t0; t00); n(tn) = m0 if rn = (sn; s0n)! tn; and i(ti) = i+1(si+1) and i(t0i) = i+1(s0i+1) if ri = (si; s0i) ! (ti; t0i), for every0 < i < n, and r0 = s0 ! (t0; t00).A generi protool for whih the reeive-send ations are dene by linear-term one-memory ations is alled linear-term one-memory protool.Theorem 5 For linear-term one-memory protools, Attak is undeidable.The proof is very similar to the one for rule-based protools, and again is by a redutionfrom PCP. However, sine we annot test in one step whether the identity produedby the intruder in fat holds, this is done in two steps. First, one side of the identityis stored (input rule) and then in the next step, the stored term is ompared with theother side of the identity (see rule (x = y; y) ! (x = y;#) below). Formally, givenan instane of PCP as above, we dene the orresponding linear-term one-memoryprotool P as follows: P has one prinipal, who performs one ation A = (I;O;R)with I := fx = y ! (x = y; x)g; O := f(ui = vi;#)! seret j i < kg; R := f(x = y; y)! (x = y;#)g [ f(uix = viy;#)! (x = y;#) j i < kg,where x and y are variables, and # 62  [ f=g is a new letter. The initial intruderknowledge is K :=  [ f=g. It is easy to see that P allows a suessful attak ithe instane of PCP has a solution. Again, the intruder does not need to enrypt,derypt, or hash messages. 10
5 The Transduer-Based Protool ModelThe previous setion indiates that, informally speaking, when prinipals an proessopen-ended data strutures and, in addition, an1. ompare submessages of arbitrary size for equality (whih is possible if termsare not linear), or2. store one message and ompare this message with a submessage of the messagebeing proessed,then seurity is undeidable. To obtain deidability, we need a devie with only nitememory, and whih does not allow to ompare messages of arbitrary size. One suhdevie is a transduer, i.e., a nite automaton with output.In what follows, we dene the instane of the generi protool model, in whihreeive-send ations are modeled by transduers. In Setion 5.1, we will disuss apa-bilities and restritions of our transduer-based model.If  is a nite alphabet,  will denote the set of nite words over , inludingthe empty word "; + :=  n f"g.Denition 6 A transduer A is a tuple (Q;;
; I;; F ) where Q is the nite set of states of A;  is the nite input alphabet; 
 is the nite output alphabet; I  Q is the set of initial states of A;   Q   
 Q is the nite set of transitions of A; and F  Q is the set of nal states of A.A path  (of length n) in A from p to q is of the form q0(v0; w0)q1(v1; w1)q2 : : :(vn 1; wn 1)qn with q0 = p, qn = q, and (qi; vi; wi; qi+1) 2  for every i < n; is alled strit if n > 0, and v0 and vn 1 are non-empty words. The word v0 : : : vn 1 isthe input label and w0 : : : wn 1 is the output label of . A path of length 0 has inputand output label ". We write p(v; w)q 2 A (p(v; w)q 2s A) if there exists a (strit)path from p to q in A with input label v and output label w.If S; T  Q, then A(S; T ) := f(p; v; w; q) j p 2 S; q 2 T; p(v; w)q 2 Ag  Q  
Q. The output of A on input v 2  is dened by A(v) := fw j there exists p 2 Iand q 2 F with (p; v; w; q) 2 A(I; F )g.If   Q ([f"g) (
[f"g)Q, A is alled transduer with letter transitionsin ontrast to transduers with word transitions. The following lemma shows that itsuÆes to onsider transduers with letter transitions.Lemma 7 Let A = (Q;;
; I;; F ) be a transduer. Then there exists a transduerA0 = (Q0;;
; I;0; F ) with letter transitions suh that Q  Q0, and A0(S; T ) =A(S; T ) for every S; T  Q. 11
Proof. Every transition of A is turned into a set of transitions suh that rst theinput label is read letter by letter and then the output label is written letter by let-ter. This requires to introdue intermediate states. Formally, let (p; v; w; q) 2  withv = v0    vl 1, vi 2  for all i < l, and w = w0   wr 1, wi 2 
 for all i < r;l = 0 or r = 0 is allowed. Assume l > 1 or r > 1 (otherwise the transition hasthe orret format). This transition an be replaed by the transitions (pi; vi; "; pi+1),i < l, and (qi; "; wi; qi+1), i < r, where p0 = p, qr = q, pl = q0, and the statesp1; : : : ; pl; q0; : : : ; qr 1 are new. Replaing every transition in this way yields a trans-duer with letter transitions, whih satises the desired property. 2In order to speify the reeive-send ations of a prinipal, we onsider speial transdu-ers, so-alled message transduers, whih satisfy ertain properties. Message transdu-ers interpret messages as words over the nite alphabet N , onsisting of the atomimessages as well as the letters \ena(", \hash(", and \)", that is,N := N [ fena( j a 2 Ng [ fhash(; )g:Messages onsidered as words over N have always a balaned number of openingparentheses, i.e., \ena(" and \hash(", and losing parentheses, i.e., \)". Often theseletters will our in expressions in the text (as in the denition of N ) without math-ing opening and losing parentheses, respetively. However, this should not lead toonfusion.A message transduer reads a message (interpreted as word) from left to right,thereby produing some output. If messages are onsidered as nite trees (where leavesare labeled with atomi messages and internal nodes are labeled with the enryptionor hash symbol), a message transduer traverses suh a tree from top to bottom andfrom left to right.Denition 8 A message transduer A (over N ) is a tuple (Q;N ; I;; F ) suh that(Q;N ;N ; I;; F ) is a transduer with letter transitions, and1. for every x 2M", A(x) M"; and2. for all p; q 2 Q, x 2M, and y 2 N , if p(x; y)q 2s A, then y 2M".The rst property is a ondition on the \external behavior" of a message transduer:Whenever a message transduer gets a message as input, then the orrespondingoutputs are also messages (rather than arbitrary words). The seond property imposessome restrition on the \internal behavior" of a message transduer. Both propertiesdo not seem to be too restritive. They should be satised for most protools; at leastthey are for the transduers in the model of the reursive authentiation protool (asdesribed in Appendix B).An open issue is whether these properties are deidable, i.e., given a transduerover N does it satisfy the properties. Nevertheless, in the model of the reursiveauthentiation protool it is easy to see that the transduers onstruted satisfy theproperties. 12
For S; T  Q, we dene MA(S; T ) := A(S; T ) \ (Q M"  N  Q). By thedenition of message transduers, MA(I; F )  (QM" M" Q) if I is the set ofinitial states and F is the set of nal states of A. Thus, message transduers speifyreeive-send ations of prinipals (in the sense of Denition 2) in a natural way.In order to dene one prinipal (i.e., the whole sequene of reeive-send ations aprinipal performs) by a single transduer, we onsider extended message transduers:A = (Q;N ;; (I0; : : : ; In)) is an extended message-transduer if AIj;Ij+1 := (Q;N ;Ij;; Ij+1) is a message transduer for all j < n. Given suh an extended messagetransduer, it denes the prinipal (Q; I0; n; ) with (j) = MAIj ;Ij+1 (Ij ; Ij+1) forj < n. In this setting, an internal ation of a prinipal orresponds to applying onetransition in the extended message transduer.Denition 9 A transduer-based protool P is a generi protool where the prini-pals are dened by extended message transduers.5.1 Disussion of the Transduer-based Protool ModelWe disuss apabilities and limitations of the transduer-based protool model. To thisend, we ompare this model with the models usually used for losed-ended protools.To make the disussion more onrete, we onentrate on the model proposed byRusinowith and Turuani (see Setion 4), whih ontains the main features. In whatfollows, we refer to their model as the rewriting model. As pointed out in Setion 3, themain dierene between the two models is the way reeive-send ations are desribed.In the rewriting model reeive-send ations are desribed by single rewrite rules andin the transduer-based model by message transduers.Let us start to explain the apabilities of message transduers ompared to rewriterules.Open-ended data strutures. As mentioned in Setion 4, with a single rewrite rule oneannot proess an unbounded number of data elds. This is, however, possible withtransduers.For example, onsidering the IKE protool (see Setion 2), it is easy to speify atransduer whih i) reads a list of SAs, eah given as a sequene of atomi messages,ii) piks one SA, and iii) returns it. With a single rewrite rule, one ould not parsethe whole list of SAs.The transduer-based model of the reursive authentiation protool (desribed inAppendix B) shows that transduers an also handle more involved open-ended datastrutures: The server in this protool generates a sequene of ertiates (ontainingsession keys) from a request message of the form hash(m0hash(m1    hash(mn)   ),where the mi's are sequenes of atomi messages and the nesting depth of the hashesis a priori unbounded (see Appendix A and B for the exat denition of the messages.)Of ourse, a transduer annot math opening and losing parenthesis, if theyare nested arbitrarily deep, sine messages are interpreted as words. However, oftenthis is not neessary: In the IKE protool, the list of SAs is a message without anynesting. In the reursive authentiation protool, the struture of request messages isvery simple, and an be parsed by a transduer. Note that a transduer does not need13
to hek whether the number of losing parenthesis in the request message mathesthe number of hashes beause all words sent to a message transduer (by the intruder)are message, and thus, well-formed.Simulating rewrite rules. Transduers an simulate ertain reeive-send ations de-sribed by single rewrite rules. Consider for example the rule enk(x) ! hash(kx),where x is a variable and k an atomi message: First, the transduer would read\enk(" and output \hash(k", and then reads, letter by letter, the rest of the inputmessage, i.e., \x)" { more preisely, the message substituted for x { and simultane-ously writes it into the output. The transduer an also hek whether the last letterof the input is a losing parenthesis; again, this is not neessary beause all words sentto a message transduer (by the intruder) are well-formed.Let us now turn to the limitations of the transduer-based model ompared to therewriting model. The main limitations are the following:1. Finite memory: In the rewriting model, prinipals an store messages of arbi-trary size to use them in subsequent reeive-send ations. This is not possiblewith transduers, sine they only have nite memory.2. Comparing messages: In the rewriting model, prinipals an hek whethersubmessages of the input message oinide; for example, if t = hash(kx)x, withk an atomi message and x a variable, a prinipal an hek whether plain textand hash math. Transduers annot do this.3. Copying messages: In the rewriting model, prinipals an opy messages ofarbitrary size; for example, in the rule enk(x) ! hash(kx)x, the message x isopied. Again, a transduer would need to store x in some way, whih is notpossible beause of the nite memory. As illustrate above, a transduer ouldhowever simulate a rule suh as enk(x)! hash(kx).4. Linear terms: A transduer annot simulate all rewrite rules with linear leftand right hand-side. Consider for example the rule enk(xAy) ! hash(yAx),where x and y are variables, and A is an atomi message. Sine in the output,the order of x and y is swithed, a transduer would have to store the messagessubstituted for x and y. However, this requires unbounded memory.The undeidability results presented in Setion 4 indiate that, if open-ended datastrutures are involved, the restritions 1. and 2. seem to be unavoidable. The questionis whether this is also the ase for the other two restritions. We will omment on thisbelow.First, we point out some work-arounds. In 1., it often (at least under reasonableassumptions) suÆes to store atomi messages suh as prinipal names, keys, andnones. Thus, one does not always need unbounded memory. One example is thereursive authentiation protool (see Appendix B). In 4., it might be possible tomodify the linear terms suh that they an be parsed by a message transduer, andsuh that the seurity of the protool is not aeted. In the example, if one hanges14
the order of x and y in the output, the rewrite rule an easily be simulated by atransduer. Finally,a work-around for the restritions 2. to 4. is to put a bound on thesize of messages aepted by prinipals; this approah is usually pursued in protoolanalysis based on nite-state model heking (e.g., [16℄). For messages of boundedsize all transformations performed by rewrite rules an also be arried out by messagetransduers.Of ourse, it is desirable to avoid suh work-arounds if possible to make the analysisof a protool more preise and reliable. One approah, whih might lift some of therestritions (e.g., 3. and 4.), is to onsider tree transduers instead of word transduersto desribe reeive-send ations. It seems, however, neessary to devise new kinds oftree transduers or extend existing one, for example tree transduers with look-ahead,that are espeially tailored to modeling reeive-send ations. A seond approah isto ombine dierent omputational models for reeive-send ations. For instane, ahybrid model in whih some reeive-ations are desribed by rewrite rules and othersby transduers might still be deidable.6 The Deidability ResultWe show the following theorem.Theorem 10 For transduer-based protools, Attak is deidable.To show deidability, we have to ope with two soures of innite behavior. First, theintruder an perform an unbounded number of steps to derive a new message, andseond, to perform one reeive-send ation, a prinipal an arry out an unboundednumber of internal ations. Note that beause transduers may have "-transitions,i.e., not in every transition a letter is read from the input, the number of transitionstaken in one reeive-send ation is not even bounded in the size of the input message.While the former soure of innity was already present in the (deidable) models forlosed-ended protools [20, 2, 13℄, the latter is new. To show Theorem 10, one thereforenot only needs to show that the number of ations performed by the intruder an bebounded, but also the number of internal ations of prinipals. In fat, it suÆes toshow the latter, sine if we an bound the number of internal ations, a prinipal onlyreads messages of bounded length and therefore the intruder only needs to produemessages of size bounded by this length. To bound the number of internal ations,we apply a pumping argument showing that long paths in a message transduer anbe trunated. This argument uses that prinipals (the extended message transduersdesribing them) have only nite memory.More formally, we will show that the following problem is deidable. This imme-diately implies Theorem 10.PathProblem. Given a nite set K  M" and k  0 message transduers A0; : : : ;Ak 1 with Ai = (Qi;N ; fqIi g;i; fqFi g) for i < k, deide whether there exist messagesmi;m0i 2M", i < k, suh that1. mi 2 d(K [ fm00; : : : ;m0i 1g) for every i < k,15
2. qIi (mi;m0i)qFi 2 Ai for every i < k, and3. seret 2 d(K [ fm00; : : : ;m0k 1g).We write an instane of the PathProblem as (K;A0; : : : ;Ak 1) and a solution of suhan instane as a tuple (m0;m00; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) of messages. The size of instanes isdened as the size of the representation for K and A0; : : : ; Ak 1.Using a pumping argument, we show that in order to nd the messages mi, m0i,for every i < k, it suÆes to onsider paths from qIi to qFi in Ai bounded in lengthby the size of the problem instane { the argument will also show that the boundsan be omputed eetively. Thus, a deision proedure an enumerate all paths oflength restrited by the (omputed) bound and hek whether their labels satisfy theonditions. (Note that for every message m and nite set K0 M", m 2 d(K0) an bedeided.) In partiular, as a \by-produt" our deision proedure will yield an atualattak (if any).The pumping argument: First, we dene a solvability preserving (quasi-)orderingon messages, whih allows to replae single messages in the intruder knowledge bynew ones suh that if in the original problem a suessful attak exists, then also inthe modied problem. This redues the pumping argument to the following problem:Trunate paths in message transduers in suh a way that the output of the originalpath is equivalent (w.r.t. the solvability preserving ordering) to the output of thetrunated path. It remains to nd riteria for trunating paths in this way. To thisend, we introdue another quasi-ordering, the so-alled path trunation ordering, whihindiates at whih positions a path an be trunated. To really obtain a bound on thelength of paths, it then remains to show that the equivalene relation orrespondingto the path trunation ordering has nite index { more aurately, an index thatan be bounded in the size of the problem instane. With this, and the fat thatmessage transduers have only nite memory, the length of paths an be restrited.Finally, to show the bound on the index, one needs to establish a bound on the depthof messages (i.e., the depth of nested enryptions and hashes) in suessful attaks.Again, we make use of the fat that message transduers have only nite memory.In what follows, the argument is desribed in more detail. The formal denitionof the orderings are, however, postponed to the subsequent setions in order to fouson the main ideas.Preserving the solvability of instanes of the path problem (f. Setion 6.1).For every i  k, we dene a quasi-ordering4 on messages i (the so-alled solvabilitypreserving ordering) whih depends on the transduers Ai; : : : ; Ak 1 and has the fol-lowing property (f. Proposition 17): For every solvable instane (K;Ai; : : : ; Ak 1)of the path problem, every m 2 K, and m 2 M" with m i m, the instane((K n fmg) [ fmg;Ai; : : : ; Ak 1) is solvable as well.Assume that a path qIi (mi;m0i)qFi 2 Ai is replaed by a shorter path suh thatthe orresponding input and output labels of the shorter path, say mi and m0i, satisfy4a reexive and transitive ordering 16
mi 2 d(K [ fm00; : : : ;m0i 1g) and m0i i+1 m0i. Then, after Ai has returned m0i oninput mi, the resulting intruder knowledge is K [ fm00; : : : ;m0i 1;m0ig instead of K [fm00; : : : ;m0i 1;m0ig. Using Proposition 17, we onlude that there still exists a solutionfor the rest of the instane, i.e., (K [ fm00; : : : ;m0i 1;m0ig;Ai+1; : : : ; Ak 1).Consequently, it remains to nd riteria for trunating long paths suh that mi 2d(K[fm00; : : : ;m0i 1g) and m0i i+1 m0i. Trunating paths suh that the ondition onmi is satised is rather easy. The involved part is the ondition on the output labelm0i. To this end, we introdue the path trunation ordering. We also need to showthat the depth of messages in solutions of the problem instane an be bounded.Trunating paths (f. Setion 6.4). We extend i to a quasi-ordering li (thepath trunation ordering) on so-alled left half-messages. Left half-messages are pre-xes of messages (onsidered as words over N ). In partiular, left half-messages maylak some losing parentheses. The \l" in li is the number of missing parentheses(the level of left half-messages); li only relates left half-messages of level l. Analo-gously, right half-messages are suÆxes of messages. Thus, they may have too manylosing parentheses; the number of additional parentheses determines the level of righthalf-messages. The equivalene relation li on left half-messages orresponding to lihas the following property (Proposition 29): For all left half-messages ; 0 of level land right half-messages  of level l,  li 0 implies  i 0. (Note that  and0 are messages.)Now, onsider two positions x < y in the path  = (qIi ;mi;m0i; qFi ) 2 Ai suhthat x, y are the output labels up to these positions, and x, y are the outputlabels beginning at these positions, i.e., m0i = xx = yy. Clearly, x, y are lefthalf-messages and x, y are right half-messages. Assume that x, y have the samelevel l (in partiular, x, y have level l) and x li y. Then, by Proposition 29, itfollows m0i = yy i xy, where xy is the output label of the path obtained byutting out the subpath in  between x and y.5 Thus, li provides us with the desiredriterion for \safely" (in the sense of 1.) trunating paths. In order to onlude thatthe length of paths an be bounded in the size of the problem instane, it remains toshow that l and the index of li (i.e., the number of equivalene lasses modulo li onleft half-messages of level l) an be bounded in the size of the problem instane. Tothis end, the following is shown.Bounding the depth of messages (f. Setion 6.2 and 6.3). We rst showthat if (m0;m00; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) is a solution of (K;A0; : : : ;Ak 1), then, for every i,their also exists a solution if the depth of mi is bounded in the size of the probleminstane (Proposition 20).We then show how the depth of the output message m0i an be bounded: Let be a path in Ai from qIi to qFi or a strit path in Ai, and x be a position in  suhthat x is the input label of  up to position x and x is the output label of  up to5One little tehnial problem is that xy does not need to be a message sine it may ontain aword of the form ena(), whih is not a message. However, if one onsiders three positions x < y < z,then one an show that either xy or yz is a message.17
x. Then, the level of x an be bounded by a polynomial in the level of x and thenumber of states of Ai (Proposition 21). As a orollary, one obtains that the depthof output messages an be bounded in the depth of input messages (Corollary 22),and using Proposition 20, that both the depth of input and output messages an bebounded in the size of the problem instane (Corollary 23).With this, one an show that the index of li is bounded (Proposition 31). More-over, beause of Corollary 23, the l in 2. (the level of the half-messages x, y, x, y)is bounded in the size of the problem instane. Therefore, li an serve as the desiredriterion for trunating paths.Following these steps, we now provide a detailed proof. We will dene the dierentorderings and prove the needed properties. In Setion 6.5 everything will be puttogether to show deidability of the path problem.In order to simplify the presentation, we will not onsider hashing, i.e., from nowon, N does not ontain the symbol \hash(". However, all denitions and resultseasily arry over to the more general ase.6.1 The Solvability Preserving Ordering iIn this setion, we formally dene the solvability preserving ordering i. In Se-tion 6.1.2 we show that i is in fat solvability preserving. To do so, we rst need toprove that i is losed under substitution (Setion 6.1.1). Finally, it is shown thatthe index of the equivalene relation indued by i is nite (Setion 6.1.3).For messages m0; : : : ;mn 1, and K;K0 M we write an(m0; : : : ;mn 1;K) insteadof an(fm0; : : : ;mn 1g[K) and anK0(m0; : : : ;mn 1;K) instead of an(fm0; : : : ;mn 1g[K) \ K0. For the denition of i, we need the ordering .Denition 11 For messages m;m0 2 M", we dene m  m0 i for all N  N :anN (m;N)  anN (m0; N).Intuitively, m  m0 says that in every ontext the set of atomi messages derivablefrom m is a subset of the atomi messages derivable from m0. For example, fora; a0; a00 2 N , ena(ena0(a00))  a0ena0(ena(a00)). Obviously,  is a quasi-ordering,i.e., it is reexive and transitive.The relation i, i  k, depends on the message transduers Ai; : : : ;Ak 1 andis dened indutively. The denition also needs the ordering vi. To understandthe denition of i reall that we want to guarantee that if (K;Ai; : : : ; Ak 1) has asolution, say (mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1), then so has (K n fmg [ fm0g;Ai; : : : ; Ak 1).The message mi may have been built up from submessages x of m. Now, if m isreplaed by m0, we need to make sure that in m0 there is a submessage x0 that anbe used instead of x. This is why we need ondition 2. in the denition below. Wealso need that i renes i+1 (1.). Finally, in our proofs we will use that i is losedunder substitution. With ondition 3., this an be shown.Denition 12 For every i  k, the solvability preserving ordering i is dened asfollows: for all m;m0 2 M", m i m0 i i) m = m0 = ", or ii) m 6= ", m0 6= ",m  m0, and if i < k, then 18
1. m i+1 m0;2. for every N  N and x 2 an(m;N) with x = ena(z) for some a 2 N andz 2 M, there exists x0 := ena0(z0) 2 an(m0; N) for some a0 2 N and z0 2 Msuh that x vi x0; and3. m vi m0.For i < k and messages m;m0 2 M", we dene m vi m0 i i) m = m0 = ", or ii)m 6= ", m0 6= ", and for every p; q 2 Qi and y 2M", p(m; y)q 2s Ai implies that thereexists y0 2M" with p(m0; y0)q 2s Ai and y i+1 y0.The following lemma is proved by a simple indution on i  k.Lemma 13 For every i  k, i is a quasi-ordering.6.1.1 Closure under SubstitutionTo show that i in fat preserves solvability (in the sense explained above), we rstshow that i is losed under substitution. This is done by indution on i  k. Thebase ase, i = k, amounts to showing that  is losed under substitution. This requiressome notation.For a set V = fv0; : : : ; vn 1g of variables and a subset T  T"(V ) of terms overV , we dene an(T ) to be the losure of T under deomposition, ane(T ) to be thelosure of T under deryption, and ane(T ) the losure of T under deomposition,enryption, and deomposition (in this order), where \" stands for omposition and\e" for enryption. Formally,an(T ) := fy 2M j there exist x; z 2M" with xyz 2 Tg;ane(T ) := fx 2M j there exist a 2 T \N with ena(x) 2 Tg [ Tane(T ) := an(ane(an(T ))):It is easy to see that an(T ) = [i0 anie(T ); (1)where an0e(T ) := T and ani+1e (T ) := ane(anie(T )).We abbreviate anie(ft0; : : : ; tn 1g [ T ) by anie(t0; : : : ; tn 1; T ), and anie(t0; : : : ;tn 1; T ) \N by anie;N (t0; : : : ; tn 1; T ).Given a term t and N  N , we say that a subterm t0 of t is N -aessible6 if1. t0 2 an(t); or2. there exists ena(t00) 2 an(t), a 2 N , and t0 is N -aessible in t00.Lemma 14 Let x0; : : : ; xn 1; x00; : : : ; x0n 1 2M be messages and t(v0; : : : ; vn 1) be aterm. If xi  x0i for all i < n, then t[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄  t[v0=x00; : : : ; vn 1=x0n 1℄.6This notion was already dened in [2℄ 19
Proof. Dene m := t[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄ and m0 := t[v0=x00; : : : ; vn 1=x0n 1℄. Be-ause of (1) it suÆes to showanie;N (m;N)  anN (m0; N)for every i  0 and N  N .Assume i = 0 and a 2 (fmg [N) \ N . If a 2 N , nothing is to show. Otherwise,t = a or there exists i < n with xi = a (i.e., t = vi). In the former ase it immediatelyfollows that a 2 anN (m0; N). In the latter ase, xi  x0i implies x0i = a, and thus,a 2 anN (m0; N).Assume i > 0 and a 2 ane(anie(m;N)) \ N . If a 2 anie(m;N), the indutionhypothesis yields a 2 anN (m0; N). Otherwise, there must exist x 2 anie(m;N), amessage z, and b 2 anie(m;N) \N with x = enb(z) and a 2 an(z). We distinguishtwo ases.i) There exists a term t0 suh that enb(t0) is a subterm of t, z = t0[v0=x0; : : : ;vn 1=xn 1℄, and t0 is (anie;N (m;N))-aessible in t. Thus, by the indution hypothe-sis, t0 is anN (m0; N)-aessible in t. Consequently, if a 2 an(t0), then a 2 anN (m0; N).Otherwise, there must exist i < n, t0; t1 2 T"(V ) suh that t0 = t0vit1, and a 2an(fxig). Beause xi  x0i, it follows a 2 an(x0i), and therefore, a 2 anN (m0; N).ii) There exists i < n suh that x, and thus z, is a submessage of xi. Let N 0 :=anie;N (m;N). By indution hypothesis N 0  anN (m0; N). We know that z and xiare N 0-aessible inm. Thus, x0i is N 0-aessible inm0, and therefore also anN (m0; N)-aessible. Now xi  x0i implies an(xi; N 0)  an(x0i; N 0), and we know a 2 an(xi; N 0).Thus, a 2 an(x0i; N 0). With N 0  anN (m0; N) this yields a 2 an(x0i; anN (m0; N)).Finally, sine x0i is anN (m0; N)-aessible in m0, we obtain a 2 anN (m0; N). 2We generalize Lemma 14 to the solvability preserving ordering i.Lemma 15 Let x0; : : : ; xn 1; x00; : : : ; x0n 1 2 M", i  k, and t(v0; : : : ; vn 1) be aterm, where every variable vi ours at most one in t. If xj i x0j for all j < n, thent[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄ i t[v0=x00; : : : ; vn 1=x0n 1℄.Proof. W.l.o.g., we an assume that xj 6= " and x0j 6= " for all j < n, sine otherwisexj = x0j = ", and we an remove vj from t altogether.The proof is by indution on i. If k = i, the statement follows immediately fromLemma 14. Dene m := t[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄ and m0 := t[v0=x00; : : : ; vn 1=x0n 1℄.Assume i < k. Following Denition 12, we show m i m0.1. From xj i x0j, j < n, it follows xj i+1 x0j. Thus, by the indution hypothesis,m i+1 m0.2. Let N  N and x 2 an(m;N) with x = ena(z) for some message z and a 2 N .Note that sine x is of the form ena(), it annot happen that just part of anxi belongs to x, and therefore, it suÆes to onsider the two following ases.i) There exists a subterm t0 of t suh that x = t0[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄ andt0 62 fv0; : : : ; vn 1g. Let x0 := t0[v0=x00; : : : ; vn 1=x0n 1℄. We know that t0 isanN (m;N)-aessible in t. Sine m  m0, t0 is also anN (m0; N)-aessible in t.20
In partiular, x0 2 an(m0; N). Sine t0 is not a variable, it follows that t0 is ofthe form ena(t00) for some term t00 over fv0; : : : ; vn 1g. Thus, x0 has the formena(z0) for some message z0. It remains to show that x vi x0.Let p; q 2 Qi, y 2 M" with  := p(x; y)q 2s Ai. We know that x is of theform t0[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄. Thus, if an vj ours in t0, then  ontains asubpath of the form pj(xj ; yj)p0j 2s Ai. The denition of message transduerguarantees that yj 2M". Moreover, there exists a term t00(v0; : : : ; vn 1), whereevery variable ours at most one, suh that y = t00[v0=y0; : : : ; vn 1=yn 1℄.Beause xj i x0j, there exists y0j 2 M" with pj(x0j ; y0j); p0j 2s Ai and yj i+1y0j. Set y0 := t00[v0=y00; : : : ; vn 1=y0n 1℄. By indution hypothesis, y i+1 y0.Furthermore, replaing in  the subpaths pj(xj ; yj)p0j by pj(x0j ; y0j); p0j showsthat p(x0; y0)q 2s Ai.ii) There exists j < n suh that x is a subterm of xj. In partiular, xj isanN (m;N)-aessible in m. Thus, beause anN (m;N)  anN (m0; N), x0j isanN (m0; N)-aessible in m0. We also know that x 2 an(xj ; anN (m;N)). Then,xj i x0j implies that there exists x0 2 an(x0j; anN (m;N)) of the form enb(z0) forsome message z0 and b 2 N with x vi x0. In partiular, x0 2 an(x0j ; anN (m0; N)),and given that x0j is anN (m0; N)-aessible in m0, it follows x0 2 an(m0; N).3. Similar to 2.,i), one shows m vi m0. 26.1.2 The Ordering i is Solvability PreservingWe show that i is solvability preserving by indution on i  k. The base ase, i = k,is a onsequene of the following lemma.Lemma 16 For all m;m0 2M, K M", if m  m0, then anN (m;K)  anN (m0;K).Proof. The proof is very similar to the one for Lemma 14. We show anie;N (m;K) anN (m0;K) for every i  0 by indution on i.Assume i = 0 and a 2 (fmg [ K) \ N . If a 2 K, nothing is to show. Otherwise,m = a, and m  m0 implies anN (m)  anN (m0), and thus, a 2 anN (m0;K).Assume i > 0 and a 2 ane(anie(m;K)) \ N . If a 2 anie(m;K), the indutionhypothesis yields a 2 anN (m0;K). Otherwise, there must exist x 2 anie(m;K), amessage z, and b 2 anie;N (m;K) with x = enb(z) and a 2 an(z). We distinguishtwo ases.i) The messages x and z are submessage of some message x0 in K. In partiular, xand z are anie;N (m;K)-aessible in x0, and thus, x and z are anN (m0;K)-aessiblein x0. Consequently, a 2 anN (m0;K).ii) The messages x and z are submessages of m. Let N := anie;N (m;K). Byindution hypothesis N  anN (m0;K). We know a 2 anN (m;N), and m  m0 impliesanN (m;N)  anN (m0; N). Thus, a 2 anN (m0; N)  anN (m0;K). 2Using Lemma 16 and 15, we prove the main statement of this subsetion.21
Proposition 17 Assume that (K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1), i  k, is a solvable instane ofPathProblem and m 2 K. Then, for every m 2 M" with m i m, the instane(K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1) with K := K n fmg [ fmg is also solvable.Proof. The proof is by indution on i  k. If m = ", then, by denition of i, m = "and nothing has to be shown. Therefore, we assume that m 6= ", and thus, m 6= ".The indution basis, i = k, immediately follows from Lemma 16.Now assume i < k. Dene N := anN (K) and M := fena(z) 2 an(m;N) jthere exist z 2 M and a 2 Ng. Let (mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) be a solution of(K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1). Thus, mi 2 d(K). If in an derivation for mi, a message of theform xena(z)y 2 an(m;N) is used to onstrut mi, we will w.l.o.g. assume that thesingle messages x; ena(z); y are used, sine all three messages belong to an(m;N).Let n be the number of times a message in M was used to derive mi from K, andlet fx0; : : : ; xn 1g be the multiset of these messages; an xj 2 M ours in this mul-tiset as many times as it was used in the derivation of mi. (Due to the assump-tion on derivations made before, every ourrene of some message in M is takeninto aount.) Also, let v0; : : : ; vn 1 be pairwise distint variables. Then, thereexists a term t over fv0; : : : ; vn 1g suh that mi = t[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄. Sinem i m, for every xj , j < n, there exists xj 2 an(m;N) with xj vi xj . Denemi := t[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄. Sine, by Lemma 16, N  an(K), we an onludexj 2 an(K), and it follows mi 2 d(K), sine the derivation of mi from K oinides withthe one for mi from K exept that the xjs are replaed by xj .In  = qIi (mi;m0i)qFi 2 Ai, there exist subpaths of the form pj(xj; yj)pj+1 2s Ai,for every j < n. By the properties of message transduers, we know that yj 2 M",and there exists a term t0 over fv0; : : : ; vn 1g, where every vj , j < n, ours exatlyone in t0, with m0i = t0[v0=y0; : : : ; vn 1=yn 1℄. Sine xj vi xj , there exists yj withpj(xj ; yj)pj+1 2s Ai and yj i+1 yj . Dene m0i := t0[v0=y0; : : : ; vn 1=yn 1℄.If we replae in  every subpath pj(xj ; yj)pj+1 2s Ai by pj(xj ; yj)pj+1 2s Ai, weobtain qIi (mi;m0i)qFi 2 Ai.By Lemma 15, we have m0i i+1 m0i. Thus, sine (K [ fm0ig;Ai+1; : : : ;Ak 1) hasa solution, by indution hypothesis, the instane (K [ fm0ig;Ai+1; : : : ;Ak 1) is alsosolvable. Finally, sine m i m implies m i+1 m, the indution hypothesis alsoyields a solution for (K[fm0ig;Ai+1; : : : ; Ak 1), and together with mi and m0i, this isa solution for (K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1). 26.1.3 The Index of the Solvability Preserving Equivalene RelationIf  is a quasi-ordering on a set S, then the relation  with a  b i a  b and b  afor all a; b 2 S is an equivalene relation on S. The equivalene lass of a modulo is denoted [a℄ := fb j a  bg. The index I() of  is the number of dierentequivalene lasses over S.In what follows, let , i, =i denote the equivalene relations orresponding to, i, and vi.We show that the index of i is nite. To this end, we rst onsider . The proofof the following lemma is straightforward.22
Lemma 18 The index of  is nite. More preisely,I() 2 O(22jNjjN j)The following proposition generalizes this to i and =i. Note that =i is only denedfor i < k.Proposition 19 The index of k, and for every i < k, the index of i and =i isnite, and an be bounded as follows:I(=i) 2 O(2I(i+1)2jQij2 )I(i) 2 O(I(i+1)  2I(=i)2jNj  I(=i))Proof. The proof is by indution on i. For i = k, Lemma 18 shows that the indexof k is nite. Assume that i < k and the index of i+1 is nite. We rst show thatthe index of =i is nite and from this onlude that i has nite index.We introdue a new equivalene relation on tuples (x; y) with x; y 2 M". Forevery x; x0; y; y0 2M" dene: (x; y) =ti (x0; y0) i y i+1 y0, and p(x; y)q 2s Ai i p(x0; y0)q 2s Ai, for every p; q 2 Qi.To prove that =ti has nite index, onsider the mapping f ti whih takes every tuple(x; y) to the tuple ([y℄i+1 ; f(p; q) j p(x; y)q 2s Aig). Sine i+1 has a nite index, itfollows that the range of f ti is nite. Moreover, it is easy to see that f ti (x; y) = f t(x0; y0)implies (x; y) =ti (x0; y0). From this, it immediately follows that =ti has nite index,and that I(=ti) 2 O(I(i+1)  2jQij2):To show that =i has nite index, dene Mi;x := f[(x; y)℄=ti j y 2 M"g. Clearly, Mi;xis a nite set, and there are only nitely many dierent sets Mi;x. Together with thefollowing laim, this implies that =i has nite index.Claim I. For messages x; x0 2M, Mi;x =Mi;x0 implies x =i x0.Proof of the laim. Assume Mi;x = Mi;x0 . We show x vi x0; x0 vi x follows bysymmetry. Let p; q 2 Qi and y 2M" with p(x; y)q 2s Ai. We know [(x; y)℄=ti 2Mi;x =Mi;x0 . Thus, there exists y0 2M" suh that [(x; y)℄=ti = [(x0; y0)℄=ti . Consequently, bydenition of =ti, y i+1 y0 and p(x0; y0)q 2s Ai. This shows x vi x0, and onludes theproof of the laim.From this it immediately follows thatI(=i) 2 O(2I(=ti))  O(2I(i+1)2jQij2 ):We now show that the index of i is nite. Let Mi;m;N := f[x℄=i j x 2 an(m;N) andx = ena(z) for z 2 M and a 2 Ng, and fi be a mapping that takes every messagem 2 M to ([m℄i+1 ; (Mi;m;N j N  N ); [m℄=i). We know that the index of i+123
and =i is nite. Thus, Mi;m;N is nite and there are only nitely many dierent setsMi;m;N . Also, reall that N is a nite set. As a onsequene, the range of fi is nite.Together with the following laim, we an onlude that i has nite index.Claim II. For messages m;m0 2M, fi(m) = fi(m0) implies m i m0.Proof of the laim. Assume fi(m) = fi(m0). We show m i m0; m0 i m follows bysymmetry.1. From fi(m) = fi(m0), we immediately obtain m i+1 m0, and in partiular,m  m0.2. Let N  N , x 2 an(m;N) with x = ena(z) for some z 2 M and a 2 N .Thus, [x℄=i 2Mi;m;N =Mi;m0;N . Consequently, there exists x0 2 an(m0; N) withx0 = enb(z0) for some z0 2M, b 2 N , and [x0℄=i = [x℄=i . In partiular, x vi x0.3. From fi(m) = fi(m0), m =i m0 follows immediately, and thus, m vi m0.This onludes the proof of the laim.As an immediate onsequene, we obtain thatI(i) 2 O(I(i+1)  2I(=i)2jNj  I(=i)) 26.2 Bounding the Depth of Input MessagesWe show the following proposition.Proposition 20 Assume that (mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) is a solution of the instane(K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1) of the path problem. Then, there exists a solution (mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) of this instane with depth(mi)  2  jQij2  I(i+1) + depth(K) + 2.In the following subsetion, we will show that the depth of m0i an be bounded aswell. As an immediate onsequene, we will obtain that to nd solutions for thepath problem it suÆes to only onsider messages of depth bounded in the size of theproblem instane.To prove Proposition 20, we need some notation. A word  2 N is a left half-message, if  is a prex of a message, i.e., there exists a word  2 N suh that  is amessage. In Setion 6.4, we also onsider right half-messages, i.e., suÆes of messages.For a left half-message , the level l() of  is dened as the number of symbols\ena(", for some a 2 N , without mathing losing parentheses. Analogously, fora right half-message , the level l() of  is the number of losing parenthesis in without a mathing enryption symbol \ena(", for some a 2 N .Now, let (mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) be a solution of the instane (K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1)of the path problem. Let  denote a pathq0(a0; b0)q1(a1; b1)    (ar 1; br 1)qr (2)24
in Ai with r > 0, aj ; bj 2 N [ f"g, for every j < r, q0 = qIi , qr = qFi , mi =a0    ar 1 2 M", and m0i = b0    br 1 2 M". We dene l(i) := l(a0    ai 1) andl0(i) := l(b0    bi 1) for all i  r, to be the input and output level funtion of ,respetively. Let mi(j; j0) := aj    aj0 1 and m0i(j; j0) := bj    bj0 1 for all 0  j j0  r.Assume depth(mi) > 2  jQij2  I(i+1) + depth(K) + 2. Then, there exist threenested enryptions enu(zu) in mi for some u 2 N and zu 2 M, u 2 f0; 1; 2g, withthe following properties. There exist positions i0; j0; i1; j1; i2; j2 in  with i0 < i0 <i1 < i2 < j2 < j1 < j0  r suh that aiu = \enu(" and aju 1 = \)" for some u 2 N and u 2 f0; 1; 2g; in partiularmi(iu; ju) is of the form enu(zu) for some zu 2M; depth(mi(iu; ju)) > depth(K) for every u 2 f0; 1; 2g; qi0 = qi1 = qi2 and qj0 = qj1 = qj2 ; and [m0i(i0; j0)℄i+1 = [m0i(i1; j1)℄i+1 = [m0i(i2; j2)℄i+1 .First assume m0i(i1; j1) 6= ". Dene  to be the path obtained from  by removingthe subpath in whih mi(i0; j0) is read and substituting it by the subpath in whihmi(i1; j1) is read, i.e., := q0(a0; b0)q1    qi0(ai1 ; bi1)qi1+1    qj1 1(aj1 1; bj1 1)qj0(aj0 ; bj0)qj0+1    qr:Obviously,  is a path in Ai sine qi0 = qi1 and qj0 = qj1 . Let t(v) be a termwith a variable v ourring exatly one in t suh that mi = t[v=mi(i0; j0)℄. Thus,the input label of  is mi := t[v=mi(i1; j1)℄ = mi(0; i0)mi(i1; j1)mi(j0; r). Usingdepth(mi(i0; j0)) > depth(K) and depth(mi(i1; j1)) > depth(K), we an onlude thatmi(i0; j0) andmi(i1; j1) are not submessage of some message in K. From this, it easilyfollows that mi 2 d(K).The output label of  is m0i := m0i(0; i0)m0i(i1; j1)m0i(j0; r). We know that themessages mi(i0; j0) and mi(i1; j1) are the input labels of the strit subpaths in  fromposition i0 to j0 and i1 to j1, respetively. Now, the denition of message transduerguarantees that m0i(i0; j0) and m0i(i1; j1) are messages as well. Consequently, m0i,obtained from substituting m0i(i0; j0) in m0i by m0i(i1; j1), is also a message. (Here weuse thatm0i(i1; j1) 6= ". Otherwise, m0i ould ontain a word of the form ena() 62 M".)In partiular, there exists a term t0(v) with a variable v ourring exatly one in t0suh that m0i = t0[v=m0(i0; j0)℄ and m0i = t0[v=m0i(i1; j1)℄.With this and using m0i(i0; j0) i+1 m0i(i1; j1), Lemma 15 implies m0i i+1 m0i.Now, Proposition 17 guarantees that the problem (K;Ai+1; : : : ;Ak 1) with K :=K[fm0ig has a solution (mi+1;m0i+1; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1). Thus, (mi;m0i;mi+1;m0i+1; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) is a solution of (K;Ai;Ai+1; : : : ;Ak 1).Finally, let us onsider the ase m0i(i1; j1) = ". Sine m0i(i2; j2) is a submessage ofm0i(i1; j1), it follows m0i(i2; j2) = ". Dene mi := mi(0; i1)mi(i2; j2)m(j1; r) and m0i :=m0i(0; i1)m0i(i2; j2)m0(j1; r). It follows, m0i = m0i. Thus, (mi;m0i;mi+1;m0i+1; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) is a solution of (K;Ai;Ai+1; : : : ;Ak 1).Iterating this argument, Proposition 20 follows.25
6.3 Bounding the Depth of Output LabelsIn what follows, let A be a message transduer and  be a path in A of the formq0(a0; b0)q1(a1; b1)    (ar 1; br 1)qr (3)with r > 0 and ai; bi 2 N [f"g for every i < r suh that a0    ar 1; b0    br 1 2M".Let l and l0 be the input and output level funtion of , respetively (f. Setion 6.2).The following proposition says that at any position in , the level of the outputat this position is bounded by the level of the input.Proposition 21 Let A = (Q;N ; fqIg;; fqF g) be a message transduer, n := jQj,and  be a path in A of the form (3) suh that q0 = qI and qr = qF , or  is strit,i.e.,  2s A. Then, it follows l0(i)  (n2  (2n+ 1) + 1)  (l(i) + 1) for every i  r.We dene depth(A) := n2  (2n+ 1) + 1:As a orollary, we obtain that the depth of the output of a message transduer isbounded by the depth of the input.Corollary 22 Let A = (Q;N ; I;; F ) be a message transduer. Then, for everym;m0 2M" with m0 2 A(m), or p(m;m0)q 2s A, for p; q 2 Q: depth(m0)  depth(A)(depth(m) + 1).Together with Proposition 29, this yields:Corollary 23 Assume that (K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1) is a solvable instane of the path prob-lem. Then, there exists a solution (mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) of this instane suhthat the depth of mi and m0i is bounded in the size of the instane. More preisely,depth(mi)  2jQij2I(i+1)+depth(K)+2 and depth(m0i)  depth(Ai)(depth(mi)+1).By indution, we an dedue that the depth of all messages in a solution of an instaneof the path problem an be bounded.The proof of Proposition 21 uses that the length of paths in A an be restrited bydepth(A). To show this we annot simple use the usual pumping argument on niteautomata sine if we trunate a path, we want to guarantee that the input label ofthe resulting path is still a message. Therefore, the path an only be ut at ertainpositions. One possibility is that the path is ut suh that an input label of the formena(   enb()   ) is replaed by enb(). Alternatively, one an ut a path suhthat if the input label is of the form xw it is replaed by x, where x and xw areleft half-messages of the same level (and thus,  is a right half-message of this level).A little tehnial problem in this ase is that x may not be a message sine it anontain a word of the form ena(), whih is not a message. The following lemma,shows how to solve this problem. For a message m = 0    r 1 2 M with i 2 N ,i < k, let lm(i) := l(0    i 1) for i  r.Lemma 24 Let m = 0    r 1 2M be a message with i 2 N , for all i < r.1. If for 0  i < j  r, lm(i) = lm(j) = 0, then 0    i 1j    r 1 2M".26
2. Let 0 < i < j < r with lm(i) = lm(j). Then, i 1 6= ena(, for any a 2 N , orj 6= ) i 0    i 1j    r 1 2M".3. If 0 < i0 < i1 < i2 < r with lm(i0) = lm(i1) = lm(i2), then 0    i0 1i1    r 1 2M" or 0    i1 1i2    r 1 2M".Proof. The rst statement is easy to see. For the seond statement, we note thatthe ondition i 1 6= ena(, for any a 2 N , or j 6= ) guarantees that i 1j is notof the form enb(), for some b 2 N . Having ruled out this possibility, it is not hardto show that 0    i 1j    r 1 is a message. Conversely, if 0    i 1j    r 1 is amessage, then, sine it does not ontain a submessage of the form enb(), it followsi 1 6= ena(, for any a 2 N , or j 6= ).For the third statement, assume that neither 0    i0 1i1    r 1 2 M" nor0    i1 1i2    r 1 2 M". From 2. it follows: i0 = ena(, for some a 2 N , i1 = ),i1 1 = enb(, for some b 2 N , and i2 = ). But then  ontains as a submessagei1 1i1 = enb(), in ontradition to the fat that  is a message. 2Now, we show how to bound the length of paths by depth(A).Lemma 25 Let  be a path of the form (3) in a message transduer A, and let n bethe number of states of A. Then, there exists a path 0 from q0 to qr in A suh thatthe length of 0 is < depth(A) and the input label of 0 is a message. Moreover, ifar 1 6= ", then the input label of the last transition in 0 is distint from ".Proof. Let m := a0    ar 1. We rst show that we an restrit the depth of an inputlabel of a path from q0 to qr by n2.Assume that depth(m) > n2. Then, there exist i0 < j0 < j1 < i1  r suh thatqi0 = qj0 , qj1 = qi1 , ai0 = ena(, for some a 2 N , ai1 1 = ) (the orresponding losingparenthesis to ai0), and analogously, aj0 = enb(, for some b 2 N , and aj1 1 = ). Itfollows that the path 0 given asq0(a0; b0)q1    qi0(aj0 ; bj0)qj0+1    (aj1 1; bj1 1)qj1(ai1 ; bi1)qi1+1    qris also a path in A from q0 to qr suh that its input label is a message. Note thatthe input label of the last transition of  and the one of 0 oinide. Iterating thisargument, we obtain a path from q0 to qr suh that the input label is a message ofdepth  n2.Thus, from now on we may assume that depth(m)  n2. In partiular, for l(i),as dened above, we know l(i)  n2 for every i  r,. Now assume r  depth(A).Then, there must exist an l  n2 suh that l(i) = l for > 2n+ 1 many i  r. Thus,there exist 0  i0 < i1 < i2 < r suh that qi0 = qi1 = qi2 and l(i0) = l(i1) = l(i2).It follows that for j 2 f0; 1g the path 0j given asq0(a0; b0)q1    qij (aij+1 ; bij+1)qij+1+1(aij+1+1; bij+1+1)    qris a path in A from q0 to qr. Lemma 24 implies that the input label of 00 or 01 is amessage. Finally, sine i2 < r, the last transition in 0j , for j 2 f0; 1g, oinides withthe one for .Iterating this onstrution, we obtain a path 0 with the desired properties. 227
Proof of Proposition 21. Let  be a path as given in Proposition 21, and assumethere exists i  r suh that l0(i) > depth(A)  (l(i) + 1). We may assume thatl(i) is minimal, i.e., there exists no j  r suh that l(j) < l(i) and l0(j) >depth(A)  (l(j) + 1). We distinguish two ases.l(i) > 0. Let j > i be minimal with l(j) = l(i)   1. From the minimality of l(i)it follows l0(j)  depth(A)  (l(j) + 1). But then, there must exist > depth(A)many positions s with i  s  j   1 and bs = ). (Otherwise, l0(j) = l0(i)   gfor some g  depth(A). Thus, l0(j) > depth(A)  (l(i) + 1)   depth(A) =depth(A)  (l(j) + 1), in ontradition to the minimality of l(i).)By the hoie of j, we know that the word ai    aj 2 is a message and that itis the input label of the subpath 0 of  from qi to qj 1. (Note that aj 1 = ).)Lemma 25 implies that there is also a path 00 in A from qi to qj 1 of length< depth(A) suh that the input label of 00 is a message. Replaing 0 in by 00 yields a new, shorter path, say , from q0 to qr, with the propertiesrequired in the proposition. In partiular, the input label of  is a message.Let l(j) and l0(j) be the input and output level funtions of , respetively.Moreover, let j denote the position in  orresponding to j in . Then, we havel0(j) > depth(A)  (l(j) + 1) and l(j) < l(i), sine < depth(A) parenthesishave been losed between position i and j   1 in , i.e.,  depth(A) parenthesisbetween i and j. Iterating this argument shows that there exists a path  withthe desired properties suh that l(i), as hosen above, is 0. Thus, the asel(i) = 0 applies. (However, we will see that this ase leads to a ontradition.)l(i) = 0. Let 0 denote the path from qi to qr with input label ai    ar 1 and outputlabel bi    br 1. Sine l0(i) > depth(A)(l(i)+1), the output label must ontain> depth(A) losing parentheses. However, aording to Lemma 25, there existsa path 00 from qi to qr in A suh that the input label of 00 is a message andthe length of 00 is < depth(A). Then, replaing 0 in  by 00 yields a new path from q0 to qr suh that the input label is a message. Moreover, if  is strit,then the new path is also strit: if the last transition in 0 ended with a inputlabel distint from ", then, aording to Lemma 25, this an be ahieved for 00as well.Now, sine the input label of  is a message, the onditions on message-trans-duers imply that the output label must also be a message. However, this is nottrue, sine at least two losing parenthesis are missing.6.4 The Path Trunation Ordering liWe now extend i to the path trunation ordering li on half-messages and showthat li is ompatible with right onatenation of right half-messages (Setion 6.4.1).We also prove that the index of the equivalene relation orresponding to li is nite(Setion 6.4.2).For the denition of left and right half-messages and their levels l() see Setion 6.2.If  is a left half-message, then there exist unique messages x0; : : : ; xl() 2 M", and28
a1; : : : ; al() 1 2 N suh that = xl()enal()(xl() 1enal() 1(xl() 2    ena1(x0:We dene the j-level half message of  to bej := enaj (xj 1enaj 1(xj 2    ena1(x0for 1  j  l(). Note that l(j) = j. Moreover, we dene  to be the messageobtained from  by adding the missing losing parentheses, i.e., :=  )   )| {z }l() :Finally, let p() := al()    a1. In order to dene li, we rst introdue the orderingl.Denition 26 Let l  0 and ; 0 be non-empty left half-messages of level l, i.e., 6= ", 0 6= ", and l() = l(0) = l. Dene  l 0 i   0 and p() = p(0).Clearly, l is a quasi-ordering. For the denition of li we need some more notation.If  and  are left half-messages, and p; q 2 Qi, then p(; )q 2h Ai means that i)p(; )q 2s Ai, and ii) there exist right half-messages , 0, and a state q0 2 Qi suhthat l() = l(), l(0) = l(), and p(; )q(; 0)q0 is a strit path in Ai. In otherwords, the strit path p(; )q an be extended to a strit path suh that the inputand output labels are messages.Denition 27 For every l  0 and i  k, the path trunation ordering li is denedas follows: for left half-messages ; 0 of level l,  li 0 i i)  = 0 = ", or ii)  6= ",0 6= ",  l 0, and if i < k, then1.  li+1 0;2.  i 0;3. j vji 0j for every 1  j  l;4. if l  1 and x; x0 2M" with  = xl and 0 = x00l, then x vi x0.For i < k, l  0, left half-messages ; 0 of level l, we dene  vli 0 i i)  =0 = ", or ii)  6= ", 0 6= ", and for every left half-message  and every p; q 2 Qi,p(; )q 2h Ai implies that there exists a left half-message 0 with l(0) = l() suhthat p(0; 0)q 2h Ai and  l()i+1 0.6.4.1 Right Conatenation of Right Half-messagesWe now show, by indution on i, that li is ompatible with right onatenation ofright half-messages. The ase i = k is shown in the following lemma.29
Lemma 28 Let ; 0 be left half-messages of level l  0. Then,  l 0 implies  0 for every right half-message  of level l.Proof. Assume  l 0. If l = 0, then , 0, and  are messages, then thelemma follows from Lemma 14, when we set t := v0v1 and onsider t[v0=; v1=℄and t[v0=0; v1=℄. In what follows we assume l > 0.We need to show that anN (;N)  anN (0;N) for every N  N . To this end,we dene two mappings F and F 0 from 2N into 2N , where 2N denotes the powersetof N . For every N  N ,F (N) := anN (enp()(); anN (; N)) andF 0(N) := anN (enp(0)(); anN (0; N));where enw() for some non-empty word w = a0    al 1 2 N+, denotes the messageena0(ena1(   enal 1(:(Note that the orresponding losing parenthesis to \enaj (" are ontained in .)Beause  l 0, we know that p() = p(0) and   0. Thus, anN (; N) anN (0; N). Consequently, F (N)  F 0(N). Using similar tehniques as in the proofof Lemma 14, it is rather straightforward to showanN (;N) = lfpN (F ) := [j0F j(N); andanN (0;N) = lfpN (F 0):From this the lemma follows. 2We an now proof the main proposition of this subsetion.Proposition 29 Let ; 0 be left half-messages of level l  0 and let i  k. Then, li 0 implies  i 0 for every right half-message  of level l.Proof. Assume  li 0. If  = ", then 0 = ", and thus,  i 0. Assume  6= "and 0 6= ". The rest of the proof is by indution on i  k. The base ase, i = k,follows from Lemma 28.Now assume i < k. If l = 0, then , 0, and  are messages, and  i 0 followsfrom Lemma 15 with t = v0v1. Therefore, we may assume that l > 0. To prove i 0, we must show the onditions in Denition 12.1. By denition,  li 0 implies  li+1 0, and thus, with the indution hypothe-sis, we obtain  i+1 0.2. Let N  N and x 2 an(;N) with x = ena(z) for some message z and a 2 N .We distinguish three ases:(a) x is a submessage of . Aording to Lemma 28,   0. Thus,anN (;N)  anN (0;N). Using p() = p(0), it follows x 2 an(0;N),and we an simply hoose x0 := x.30
(b) x is a submessage of . It follows x 2 an(; anN (;N)). Sine  i 0,there exists x0 2 an(0; an(;N)) suh that x0 is of the form enb(z0) forsome message z0 and b 2 N and x vi x0. Finally, beause anN (;N) anN (0;N) (Lemma 28), it follows x0 2 an(0; an(0;N)), and thus,x0 2 an(0;N).() x is of the form j0 for some 1  j  l and a right half-message 0 suhthat 0 is a prex of  with l(0) = l(j). Dene x0 := 0j0. Obviously,x0 is a message of the form ena(z0) for some message z0 and a 2 N .Sine anN (;N)  anN (0;N) (Lemma 28) and p() = p(0) it followsx0 2 an(0;N). We need to show x vi x0.Let p; q 2 Qi, y 2 M" suh that p(x; y)q 2s Ai. There exists p0 2Qi, and a left half-message  and a right half-message 0 suh that y =0, l() = l(0), p(j ; )p0 2s Ai, and p0(0; 0)q 2 Ai. We know thatp(j ; )p0(0; 0)q is a strit path in Ai and that x = j0 and y = 0 aremessages. Thus, p(j ; )p0 2h Ai. From  li 0, we obtain j vl(j)i 0j,and onsequently, there exists a left half-message 00 with l() = l(00),p(0j ; 0)p0 2s Ai, and  l()i+1 00. This yields that p(0j; 0)p0(0; 0)q is astrit path from p to q in Ai with input label x0 and output label y0 := 000.By the indution hypothesis, y = 0 i+1 000 = y0.3. We show  vi 0. Let p; q 2 Qi and y 2 M" with p(; y)q 2s Ai. Sinel > 0,  has the form xl for some message x. We rst assume x 6= ". Thus,there exist words y0; y1; ; 0 2 N and states p0; p1; p2 with p(x; y0)p0 2s Ai,p0("; y1)p1 2 Ai, p1(l; )p2 2s Ai, and p2(; 0)q 2 Ai, where the input label ofthe last transition of the latter path is 6= ".Sine the rst path is strit and x is a message, by the denition of messagetransduer, it follows y0 2 M". Sine the path from p1 to q is strit and l isa message, we know that 0 is a message. Partiularly,  is a left half-messageand 0 is a right half-message with l() = l(0). Finally, sine y = y0y10 2M"and y0, 0 2M", we an onlude y1 2M".Now,  li 0 implies l vli 0l, and we know that p1(l; )p2(; 0)q is a stritpath in Ai, and l and 0 are messages. Thus, p1(l; )p2 2h Ai. As a result,there exists a left half-message 00 with l(00) = l(), p1(0l; 00)p2 2s Ai, and l()i+1 00. Moreover, if 0 = x00l, then  li 0 implies x vi x0. Thus, thereexists y00 2 M" with p(x0; y00); p0 2s Ai and y0 i+1 y00. Therefore, replaingin the path p(x; y)q the subpath p(x; y0)p0 by p(x0; y00); p0 and p1(l; )p2 byp1(0l; 00)p2 yields a strit path from p to q with input label 0 and outputlabel y0 := y00y1000 2M".It remains to show y i+1 y0. By indution,  l()i+1 00 implies 0 i+1 00.We also know y0 i+1 y00 and y1 i+1 y1. Thus, by Lemma 15, with t = v0v1v2we obtain y = t[v0=y0; v1=y1; v2=0℄ i+1 t[v0=y00; v1=y1; v2=000℄ = y0.If x = " and x0 is dened as above, it follows x0 = ", beause x vi x0. The restof the proof is similar to the ase x 6= ". 231
6.4.2 The Index of the Path Trunation OrderingLet l, li, and =li denote the equivalene relations orresponding to l, li, and vli.We prove that li has nite index by indution on i. The base ase follows fromthe following lemma.Lemma 30 For every l  0, the index of l is nite, and an be bounded as follows:I(l) 2 O(I()  jN jl)Proof. Let fl be a mapping that takes a left half-message  of level l to the tuple([℄; p()). Sine  has nite index and there are only a nite number of wordsover N of length l, the range of fl is nite, namely, I()  jN jl. Moreover, it is easy tosee that fl() = fl(0) implies  l 0 for all left half-messages  and 0 of level l. 2The proof of the following proposition is very similar to the one for Proposition 19.However, it requires Proposition 21.Proposition 31 For all l  0, the index of lk, and for every i < k, the index of liand =li is nite, and an be bounded as follows:I(=li) 2 OI(depth(Ai)(l+1)i+1 )  2jQij2depth(Ai)(l+1)I(li) 2 O I(li+1)  I(i)  I(=li)l  I(=i)Proof. The proof is by indution on i. For i = k, Lemma 30 shows that the indexof lk is nite. Assume that i < k and the index of li+1 is nite. We rst show thatthe index of =li is nite and from this onlude that li has nite index.For every l; l0  0, we introdue a new equivalene relation on tuples (; ) withleft half-messages  and . More preisely, for left half-messages ; 0; ; 0 withl() = l(0) = l and l() = l(0) = l0 we dene: (; ) =l;l0i (0; 0) i  l0i+1 0, and p(; )q 2h Ai i p(0; 0)q 2h Ai, for every p; q 2 Qi.Just as for =ti in the proof of Proposition 19, one shows that =l;l0i has nite index, andthat I(=l;l0i ) 2 O(I(l0i+1)  2jQij2):To show that =li has nite index, dene for l; l0  0 and a left half-message  of levell the set M l;l0i; := f[(; )℄=l;l0i j  is a left half-message of level l0gand the tuple M li; := (M l;l0i; j l0  depth(Ai)  (l + 1)):Clearly, for xed l; l0, and i the number of dierent sets M l;l0i; is nite. Consequently,the set of tuplesM li; for xed l and i is also nite. Together with the following laim,this implies that =li has nite index. 32
Claim. For all l  0 and left half-messages ; 0 with  6= ", 0 6= ", and l() =l(0) = l: M li; =M li;0 implies  =li 0.Proof of the laim. Assume M li; =M li;0 . We show  vli 0; 0 vli  follows by sym-metry. Let p; q 2 Qi and  be a left half-message with p(; )q 2h Ai. By denition of2h, their exist right half-messages , 0, and a state q0 2 Qi suh that p(; )q(; 0)q0is a strit path in Ai. Then, Proposition 21 implies l0 := l()  depth(Ai)  (l + 1).Now, using M li; = M li;0 , it follows [(; )℄=l;l0i 2 M l;l0i; = M l;l0i;0 . Thus, there exists aleft half-message 0 with l(0) = l0 suh that [(; )℄=l;l0i = [(0; 0)℄=l;l0i . In partiular, l0i+1 0, and from p(; )q 2h Ai it follows p(0; 0)q 2h Ai. This onludes theproof of the laim.It is easy to see that I(ri )  I(r0i ) and I(=ri )  I(=r0i ), for every r  r0. Fromthis we an onludeI(=li) 2 OI =l;depth(Ai)(l+1)i depth(Ai)(l+1) OI depth(Ai)(l+1)i+1   2jQij2depth(Ai)(l+1)Now it is easy to show that the index of li is nite. Consider the mapping f li thattakes a left half-message  of level l to the tuple([℄li+1 ; [℄i ; [1℄=1i ; : : : ; [l℄=li ; [x℄=i);where x is a message suh that  = xl. Obviously, the range of f li is nite. Finally,it is straightforward to prove for left half-messages , 0 with l() = l(0) = l thatf li () = f li (0) implies  li 0. From this, the bound on I(li) laimed in the propo-sition follows immediately. 26.5 Proof of Theorem 10Putting everything together, we now show that the path problem is deidable. Thiswill onlude the proof of Theorem 10.We show that to nd a solution of an instane of PathProblem, it suÆes toonsider paths (and thus, messages) of length restrited in the size of the probleminstane. To this end, we assume that the instane (K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1) has the solution(mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1), and then onstrut a solution with short paths. We do soby indution on i  k. For i = k, nothing is to be shown. For the indution step weneed some notation.Assume  = q0(a0; b0)q1(a1; b1)    (ar 1; br 1)qr (4)is a path in Ai with a0    ar 1 = mi, b0    br 1 = m0i, q0 = qIi , and qr = qFi . Letmi(j; j0) := aj    aj0 1 and m0i(j; j0) := bj    bj0 1 for all 0  j  j0  r. We dene33
lj := l(j) and l0j := l0(j), where l and l0 are the input and output level funtions of (f. Setion 6.2).Due to Corollary 23, we may assume that the depth of mi and m0i is bounded inthe size of the problem instane.We dene N := anN (K) andM := fena(z) 2 an(K) j z 2M and a 2 Ng. Similarto the proof of Proposition 17, let n be the number of times a message inM was usedto derive mi 2 d(K) from K, and let fx0; : : : ; xn 1g be the multiset of these messages;an xj 2 M ours in this multiset as many times as it was used in the derivation ofmi. Also, let v0; : : : ; vn 1 be pairwise distint variables. Then, there exists a termt 2 d(N [ fv0; : : : ; vn 1g), suh that every variable vj, j < n, ours exatly one int and mi = t[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄. Moreover, there exist positions ij ; i0j  r in suh that xj = aijaij+1    ai0j 1, aij 6= ", and ai0j 1 6= ", for every j < n. That is, thesubpath in  between the positions ij and i0j is a strit path in Ai with input label xj.Finally, we dene a mapping f as follows: For every j  r,f(j) := 8><>: (qj ; lj ; l0j ; [m0i(0; j)℄l0ji+1 ; xs;mi(is; j)); there exists s < n s.t. is < j < i0s;(qj ; lj ; l0j ; [m0i(0; j)℄l0ji+1); otherwise.This mapping indiates at whih positions  an be trunated. It distinguishes be-tween positions \inside" and \outside" an xj. The following lemma makes this preise.Lemma 32 If there exist j0, j1, and j2 with 0  j0 < j1 < j2  r and f(j0) =f(j1) = f(j2), then there exists u 2 f0; 1g and a solution (mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1)of (K;Ai; : : : ; Ak 1) suh that the path :=q0(a0; b0)q1    qju(aju+1 ; bju+1)qju+1+1(aju+1+1; bju+1+1)    (ar 1; br 1)qris a path in Ai from qIi to qFi with input label mi = mi(0; ju)mi(ju+1; r) and outputlabel m0i = m0i(0; ju)m0i(ju+1; r);Proof. From f(j0) = f(j1) = f(j2) it follows that lj0 = lj1 = lj2 . Now, Lemma 24implies that there exists u 2 f0; 1g suh that mi := mi(0; ju)mi(ju+1; r) is a message.Sine  is a path from qIi to qFi with input label mi, from the properties of messagetransduers (f. Denition 8) it follows that m0i := m0i(0; ju)m00(ju+1; r) must be amessage.Obviously,  is a path from qIi to qFi with input label mi and output label m0i.It remains to show that there exist messagesmi+1;m0i+1; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1 suh that(mi;m0i; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) is a solution of (K;Ai; : : : ; Ak 1).We rst show mi 2 d(K): Note that if is < ju < i0s for some s < n, then f(ju) =f(ju+1) implies that there exists s0 < n with xs = xs0 and mi(is; ju) = mi(is0 ; ju+1).Thus, xs = mi(is; ju)mi(ju+1; is0). That is, after removing the subpath in  betweenju and ju+1, we still have xs as a submessage. In this way, the two extra omponentsin the rst tuple of the denition of f prohibit that only part of an xs is removedwhen going from  to 0. From this, it is easy to onlude that there exists a termt 2 d(N [fv0; : : : ; vn 1g), in whih every variable vj , j < n, ours at most one, suhthat mi := t[v0=x0; : : : ; vn 1=xn 1℄. Thus, mi 2 d(K).34
Beause f(ju) = f(ju+1), we know [m0i(0; ju)℄l0i+1 = [m0i(0; ju+1)℄l0i+1 and l0 :=l0ju = l0ju+1. With Proposition 29 we an onludem0i = m0i(0; ju+1)m0i(ju+1; r) i+1 m0i(0; ju)m0i(ju+1; r) = m0i:Now, Proposition 17 guarantees that the instane (K;Ai+1; : : : ; Ak 1) with K := K [fm0ig has a solution (mi+1;m0i+1; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1), and thus, (mi;m0i;mi+1;m0i+1; : : : ;mk 1;m0k 1) is a solution of (K;Ai; : : : ;Ak 1). 2We now need to show that the range of f an be bounded in the size of the probleminstane. By assumption, the depth of mi and m0i is bounded, and thus, lj and l0j arebounded for every j  r in the size of the problem instane. Now, by Proposition 31,it easily follows that the range of f is bounded in the size of the problem instane.Consequently, applying Lemma 32, the length of the paths qIi (mi;m0i)qFi 2 Ai anbe bounded as well (and this bound an be omputed eetively). By indution,this holds for every path qIj (mj ;m0j)qFj 2 Aj, i  j < k. Thus, given an instane(K;A0; : : : ;Ak 1) of the path problem, a deision algorithm an rst ompute thebound on the length of the paths and then, enumerate all paths of length restrited bythe (omputed) bound and hek whether their labels satisfy the required onditions.We onlude:Proposition 33 PathProblem is deidable.As an immediate onsequene, we obtain Theorem 10.7 A Complexity Lower BoundWe prove the following theorem.Theorem 34 For transduer-based protools, Attak is PSPACE-hard.We rst show:Theorem 35 PathProblem is PSPACE-hard.This is done by redution from the nite automata intersetion problem, whih hasbeen shown to be PSPACE-omplete by Kozen (see [11℄).The nite automata intersetion problem is dened as follows: Given k  0 de-terministi nite automata B0; : : : ;Bk 1 with a ommon alphabet , deide whetherthere exists a word w 2  aepted by Bi for all i < k.7In what follows, assume Bi = (Qi;; qIi ; Æi; Fi), where Qi is the set of states, qIi isthe initial state, Æi is the transition funtion, and Fi is the set of nal states of Bi.Given the Bi's, we dene the orresponding path problem as follows. The set ofatomi messages N is  [ fa; seretg, where a and seret are new atomi messages.The initial intruder knowledge K is . The message transduer Ai will orrespond toBi. Before A0 reads a letter, it outputs \ena(", then simulating B0, reads some word7If k is xed, this problem an be deided in polynomial time.35
w and also outputs this words, and nally outputs \)". In other words, A0 returnsmessages of the form ena(w), where w is aepted by B0. The message transduersAi, 0 < i < k, do the same, but they aept the input messages to be of the formena(w), and they only output this message if w is aepted by Bi. Additionally,An 1 returns seret. The enryption of w guarantees that the intruder must send thesame word w (ena(w)) to all the Ai's. Without enryption, the intruder ould senddierent words w0 to every Ai. Formally,A0 := (Q0 [ fq00 ; q10 ; q20; q30g;N ; fq00g;0; fq30g)with 0 := f(q00 ; "; ena(; q10); (q10 ; "; "; qI0)g [f(q; b; b; q0) j Æ0(q; b) = q0g [f(q; "; "; q20) j q 2 F0g [f(q20 ; "; ); q30)g;and for 0 < i < k   1,Ai := (Qi [ fq0i ; q1i ; q2i ; q3i g;N ; fq0i g;i; fq3i g)with i := f(q0i ; ena(; ena(; q1i ); (q1i ; "; "; qIi )g [f(q; b; b; q0) j Æi(q; b) = q0g [f(q; "; "; q2i ) j q 2 Fig [f(q2i ; ); ); q3i )g:Finally, Ak 1 is dened just as Ai for 0 < i < k   2 exept that the transition(q2i ; ); ); q3i ) is replaed by (q2i ; ); ); q02i ) and (q02i ; "; seret; q3i ), where q02i is a new state.Now, it easy to see that there exists a word w 2  aepted by Bi for all i < ki the instane (K;A0; : : : ;Ak 1) of the path problem has a solution. This provesTheorem 35.We an basially employ the same argument for Attak. We simply onjoin themessage transduers Ai into one extended message transduer A = (Q;N ;; (I0; : : : ;Ik)), whereQ and  are the union of the states and transitions of the Ai's, respetively,and Ii := fq0i g for i < k, and Ik := fq3k 1g. We assume that the set of states of the Ai'sare disjoint, exept that we identify q3i 1 and q0i for 0 < i < k. Again, it is easy to seethat there exists a word w 2  aepted by Bi for all i < k i the transduer-basedprotool with one prinipal dened by A allows a suessful attak. Thus, Theorem 34follows.An alternative redution would be to onsider a protool with k prinipals, wherethe ith prinipals performs exatly one reeive-send ation whih is dened by Ai. Toavoid that the intruder rst sends a message, say the word w, to A0, and then sendsthe message ena(w) returned by A0 immediately to Ak 1, one an add a \ounter"to the output messages. That is, A0 outputs ena(aw) instead of ena(w), A1 onlyaepts a message if it is of this form and outputs ena(aaw), and so forth.36
8 ConlusionWe have introdued a generi protool model for analyzing the seurity of open-ended protools, i.e., protools with open-ended data strutures, and investigated thedeidability of dierent instanes of this model. In two instanes, reeive-send ationsare modeled by sets of rewrite rules. We have shown that in these instanes, seurityis undeidable. These results indiated that to obtain deidability, prinipals shouldonly have nite memory and should not be able to ompare messages of arbitrary size.This motivated our transduer-based model, whih omplies to these restritions, butstill aptures ertain open-ended protools. We have shown that in this model seurityis deidable and PSPACE-hard; it remains to establish a tight omplexity bound.While in this paper we have onentrated on the shared key setting and sereyproperties, we onjeture that our results arry over rather easily to publi key en-ryption and authentiation.As pointed out in Setion 5.1, a promising future diretion is to ombine thetransduer-based model with the models for losed-ended protools and to devise treetransduers suitable for desribing reeive-send ations. We will also try to inorpo-rate omplex keys, sine they are used in many protools. We believe that the prooftehniques devised in this paper will help to show deidability also in the more pow-erful models. Finally, enouraged by the work that has been done for losed-endedprotools, the long-term goal of the work started here is to develop tools for automativeriation of open-ended protools, if possible by integrating the new algorithms intoexisting tools.Aknowledgement I thank Thomas Wilke for many helpful 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ol by Otway and Rees [17℄ in that it allowsto establish session keys between an a priori unbounded number of prinipals in oneprotool run. Our desription of the RA protool follows Paulson [18℄.Informally speaking, the protool works as follows: We assume that a authenti-ation server S shares long-term keys with the prinipals. If prinipal A wants toestablish a session key with prinipal B, she sends a request message to B. In theOtway-Rees protool, B would now ontat the server S, whih in turn would gen-erate a session key and distribute it to A and B. In the reursive authentiationprotool, B an also ontat another prinipal, say C, to request a session key withC, then C an ontat yet another prinipal, and so on, until a prinipal ontats S.During eah round a prinipal adds his name and a fresh none to the ever-growingrequest message. When S obtains this message, S generates fresh keys for the pairsof prinipals requesting session keys, i.e., S generates a key for A and B, one for Band C, and so forth. Finally, S distributes the keys to the prinipals, enrypted withthe respetive long-term keys. What is important to note is that the request messageis an open-ended data struture. It has an unbounded number of data elds, namelyan unbounded sequene of pairs of prinipals requesting session keys, whih the serverneeds to proess in one reeive-send ation. Also note that the number of reeive-sendations performed and prinipals involved in one protool run is unbounded. For rea-sons pointed out above, in our model of the RA protool we assume a xed bound(see Appendix B).In what follows, we give a more formal desription of the RA protool. We startwith some notation.Let hash(m) be the hash of m, and hashk(m) the message hash(km)m, wherekm is the message obtained from k and m by onatenation, and hash(km)m is theonatenation of hash(km) and m. In the protool, k will be a long-term key sharedbetween the server S and a prinipal. It is used by the server to identify the prinipals.In other words, hashk(m) ontains the message m plus the message authentiationode for m omputed using k.Figure 1 depits the protool run informally desribed above: First, A ontats B,then B ontats C, and C ontats the server S. Then, the session keys generated by39







Figure 1: The Reursive Authentiation Protool5. C ! B :enKb(KbCNb)enKb(KabANb)enKa(KabBNa)6. B ! A :enKa(KabBNa)Note that in steps 4 to 6, a prinipal just extrats his part of the message and simplyforwards the rest. For the analysis of the protool, one an therefore assume thatevery prinipal only reads his own ertiates { the intruder an do the forwardinginstead. This is how the protool will be modeled in Appendix B.B Modeling the Reursive Authentiation ProtoolWe now provide a formal desription of the reursive authentiation protool in thetransduer-based model. To this end, we rst need to simplify the messages exhangedbetween the prinipals (Appendix B.1). We then present the message transduers forthe agents (Appendix B.2), i.e., all prinipals exept the server, and in Appendix B.3for the server.In what follows, let P0; : : : ; Pn be the prinipals partiipating in the reursiveauthentiation protool. We assume that Pn = S is the server. Every Pi, i < n,shares a long-term key Ki with S. The none sent by Pi in the request message isdenoted Ni, i < n.B.1 Simplied MessagesIn order to use message transduers to model the prinipals, we simplify the messagesexhanged. In the original protool, as desribed in Appendix A, request messageshave the form hashKil 1 (xl 1hashKil 2 (xl 2    hashKi0 (x0)   );where hashK(m) := hash(Km)m. For l = 2, this yieldshash(Ki1x1hash(Ki0x0)x0)x1hash(Ki0x0)x0:The server S would hek whether the hashes are taken over the orret messages,that is, the rst hash in the message is really taken over Ki1 plus the plain text41
x1hash(Ki0x0)x0, and in this plain text the hash is really omputed from the messageKi0x0. For growing l, the hashes are taken over messages of growing size. Thus, theserver needs unbounded memory to hek whether the hash is orret: It would rstread the message inside the hash, and then ompare it to the plain text message.However, a transduer has only nite memory, thus annot perform this task. Wehave disussed this problem in Setion 5.1. To deal with it, we an proeed in twodiretions.1. We x l, and a transduer only aepts messages with the nesting depth of thehashes restrited by l.2. A prinipal simply assumes, without heking, that plain text and hash math.The rst alternative means that the reursive authentiation protool, whih is anopen-ended protool, is \approximated" by a losed-ended protool. To this approx-imation one ould apply known formal methods. However, one would risk to misssome attaks, whih may have been possible in the open-ended setting.In the seond approah, the restrited omputational power of prinipals may leadto additional suessful attaks. However, the absene of an attak guarantees thatalso with more powerful prinipals there is no attak. Therefore, we will follow thisapproah. In fat, the whole point of using transduers is to model prinipals aeptingmessages with an unbounded number of data elds.Now, sine transduers annot hek whether hash and plain text math, we dis-ard the plain text altogether and only onsider request messages of the following,simpler form: hash(Kil 1xl 1hash(Kil 2xl 2    hash(Ki0x0)   ): (5)A prinipal Pi, i < n, given an input message of the form (5) will return a messageof the form xlhash(Kixlhash(Kil 1xl 1hash(Kil 2xl 2    hash(Ki0x0)   )), i.e., xl issent in plain text, beause otherwise the intruder ould not get hold of the request mes-sage. Note that in the reursive authentiation protool as desribed in AppendixA,the requests (e.g., \BCNb") are also sent in plain text (together with the messageauthentiation ode).In what follows, we show how the prinipals Pi, i  n, are modeled by extendedmessage transduers. The set of atomi messages is N := fPi j i  ng [ fKi j i <ng [ fNi j i < ng [ fKjj0 j j < n; j0  ng [ f g. The initial intruder knowledge Kontains all the prinipal names plus the symbol \ " and the empty word ". Oneould also add keys Ki and nones Ni in ase the intruder ontrols Pi.B.2 The Extended message transduer of the AgentsWe now dene the extended message transduer Ai for Pi, i < n. The states ofthe transduer onsist of three omponents. The rst takes the values request, opy,key, and aept, indiating whih step is performed: request means that Pi sends hisrequest message. If the message onsists of nested hashes, it is neessary to opy thereeived message. This is done in state opy. In state key, Pi waits for the response42
message and extrats the session keys. Then Pi proeeds to state aept. In the seondomponent Pi stores the name of the prinipal who wants to share a session key withPi. Analogously, the third omponent takes the name of the prinipal Pi has alled.The latter two omponents have value ?, if the neessary information is not availableyet.In what follows, to inrease readability, a transition (p; v; w; q) is written in thefollowing form: p vw > qThe transduer Ai ontains the following transitions, whih are labeled with words(instead of only single letters or " as required for message transduers) in order tosimplify the presentation:81. Pi initiates a protool run and alls Pj0 : For every j0  n,(request;?;?) "PiPj0Nihash(KiPiPj0Ni ) > (key;?; Pj0);2. Pi is alled by Pj and alls Pj0 : For every j < n, j0  n, a0; a1 2 N ,(request;?;?) hash(a0PjPia1PiPj0Nihash(KiPiPj0Nihash(a0PjPia1 > (opy; Pj ; Pj0);3. Pi opies the rest of the input message: For every j < n, j0  n, a 2 N ,(opy; Pj ; Pj0) aa > (opy; Pj ; Pj0);4. Pi onludes his request message with \)": For every j < n, j0  n,(opy; Pj ; Pj0) ") > (key; Pj ; Pj0);5. Pi, who initiated the protool run, expets one ertiate ontaining the sessionkey for ommuniation with Pj . The output message ena(seret) is used tohek whether the intruder an get hold of a: For every j0  n and a 2 N ,(key;?; Pj0) enKi(aPj0Ni)ena(seret) > (aept;?;?);6. Pi reads the two ertiates ontaining the session keys for ommuniation withPj and Pj0 : For every j < n, j0  n, and a0; a1 2M,(key; Pj ; Pj0) enKi(a0Pj0Ni)enKi(a1PjNi)ena0(seret)ena1(seret) > (aept;?;?):8Note that words read/written in one transition are not neessarily messages, i.e., the number ofparenthesis may be unbalaned. 43
To omplete the denition of the extended message transduer, it remains to speifysubsets I0; I1; I2 of the state spae: I0 := f(request;?;?)g, I1 := f(key; Pj ; Pj0) j j <n; j0  ng, I2 := f(aept;?;?)g.Sine the transduer dened so far is a transduer with word-transitions, we needto turn it into one with letter transitions. For all transitions, exept the ones in2., this is done as in the proof of Lemma 7. For the transitions in 2., one rstoutputs hash(KiPiPj0Ni (letter by letter) and then simultaneously reads and writeshash(a0PjPia1 (letter by letter). Thus, the outer hash is written before the innerhashes are read/written. If in 2. rst the input was read and then the output (assuggested in the proof of Lemma 7), then when Ai performs transition 4. the losingparenthesis for the outer hash hash(KiPiPj0Ni written in 2. would be written afterthe last losing parenthesis of the input. Thus, if the input is ompletely written,the output up to this point would not be a message. But this would violate theseond property for message transduers. Nevertheless, if in 2. the transitions aretranslated into transitions with letters as explained above, one an easily hek thatthe onditions for message transduers (f. Denition 8) are satised.Finally, we remark that in the model for Pi we have assumed that a prinipal anhek whether a message is atomi. Thus, we have a restrited kind of typing. Forexample, in transition 2. the prinipal Pi only aepts the outer hash if a0 and a1are atomi messages. If keys and nones ould be arbitrary messages, the transduerould not parse the nested hashes orretly.B.3 The Extended Message Transduer of the ServerWe dene the extended message transduer An for the server Pn = S. The statesonsist of three omponents. The rst takes the values start, read, readpar, and aept.In the state start, An reads the rst symbols of the message, heks whether thismessage is really addressed to S, and generates the rst ertiates. In state read,An proesses the rest of the requests. At the end, An needs to read remaining losingparentheses. This is done in state readpar. If everything is ok, S goes into the stateaept. In the seond omponent, An memorizes whose ertiates are to be generated,and the third omponent stores the orresponding none.The transitions in An, again labeled with words, are speied as follows:1. S reads the rst request and generates the orresponding ertiate: For everya 2 N , (start;?;?) hash(KiPiSaenKi(KinSa) > (read; Pi; a);2. Pi has initiated the protool run, and therefore, no additional ertiate needsto be generated: For every i < n and a 2 N ,(read; Pj ; a)  " > (readpar;?;?);3. The remaining ertiate for Pi is generated and a new one for Pi0 : For every44
i; i0 < n and a0; a1 2 N ,(read; Pi; a0) hash(Ki0Pi0Pia1enKi(Ki0iPi0a0)enKi0 (Ki0iPia1) > (read; Pi0 ; a1);4. The remaining losing parentheses are read:(readpar;?;?) )" > (readpar;?;?);5. S is done if the last losing parenthesis is read:(readpar;?;?) )" > (aept;?;?):Sine S only performs a single ation, we only need to dene two sets I0 and I1:I0 := f(start;?;?)g, I1 := f(aept;?;?)g. If An is turned into a transduer withletter transitions as in the proof of Lemma 7, it is easy to see that (An)I0;I1 is amessage transduer. In partiular, the two onditions imposed on message transduersare satised.Just as in Setion B.2, we assume that S an hek whether a message is atomi.For instane in 1., S only aepts the outer hash if a is atomi.Finally, note that the nones sent by the prinipals to S must be stored by Sbeause they may our in two ertiates. That is, S must opy submessages. Asexplained in Setion 5.1, beause of the nite memory of transduers, this is onlypossible if the submessages to be opied have bounded size. Therefore, S, as modeledhere, assumes nones to be atomi.
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